A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy by Smith, Thomas A




1. THE FAIR DISTRIBUTION PROBLEM IN MASS TORT BANKRL'IrCY ....... 371
A. Mass Tort Bankruptcies and Mass Tort Bankruptcyv Trusts ........... 372
B. Definzing Fair Distribution in the Mass Tort Bankruptcv" Setting ....... 378
II. ORIGINS OF THE FAIR DISTRIBUTION PROBLEM ...................... 382
A. Factors Affecting Allocational Decisions ....................... 383
1. Psychological Factors ................................. 383
2. Judicial and Attorney hicenttves ......................... 384
3. Strategic Bargaining in the Bankruptcy Process ............... 385
4. Strategic Behavior by Equity in the Manville Reorgauzation ..... 389
B. The Roe Proposal for Mass Tort Reorganizaton ................... 391
III. A CAPITAL MARKETS APPROACH TO MASS TORT BANKRL'IrrCY .......... 394
A. Solving the Fair Distribution Problem: Structuring the Trust and
Compensation .......................................... 395
B. The Pricig of Trust Shares and the Fair Distribution Problem ....... 398
C. A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptt) at Work ....... 401
1. Marketable Trust Shares and New Information ............... 401
2. Capital Markets and Biased Price Determination ............. 403
3. Capital Markets and the Cost of Rent Seekig ................ 404
4. The Liquidation Process and Rational Erpectations ............ 405
5. The Market for Trust Shares ...... ..................... 406
6. Risk Sharing Among Participants i the Trust Share Market ...... 408
D. The Fainiess of the Capital Markets Approach .................. 409
t Associate Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. A B. 1979. Cornell
University; B.A., 1981. Oxford University; J.D.. 1984. Yale Law School I would like to thank Larr
Alexander. Gail Henot. Randy Kroszncr. Laura Lin. Mike Rappaport. J. Gregory Sidak. Myron B. Slo'. in
Steve Walt, Mary Jo Wiggins, Chris Wonnell. Susan Woodward. and Fred Zachanas for helpful
discussions, sources, and comments. Professors David A. Skeel. Jr. and \ilham K.S Wang kindly pro% ided
especially helpful comments on some or all of the Article. Thanks to Jeff Kerrane for %aluable research
assistance. Special thanks to Bob Hillman for his inspiration. crucial insights, and encouragement- For MT
367
The Yale Law Journal
1. The Role of Government ................................ 409
2. The Problem of Inefficient Capital Markets .................. 411
3. Administrative and Capital Markets Approaches as Risk
Management ........................................ 415
IV. THE CAPITAL MARKETS APPROACH AND UNCERTAINTY ABOUT INSOLVENCY . 419
A. Tranches of Trust Shares and Priority in Bankruptcy .............. 420
B. A Capital Markets Approach to Uncertainty Concerning Insolvency .... 422
1. Tort Bonds ......................................... 423
2. The Pricing of Tort Bonds .............................. 425
3. Operational Costs ................................... 427
4. Triggering Bankruptcy ................................ 428
5. Current Bankruptcy Law and Tort Bonds ................... 429
6. Controlling Opportunism by Equity Holders and Managers ...... 431
V. CONCLUSION .............................................. 432
After six years of complex litigation, the Manville Trust finally opened for
business in 1988.1 Its mission was to compensate as fully as possible the
thousands of persons injured by Manville asbestos products. The long latency
period of asbestos-caused diseases made the Trust's mission deeply
problematic. No one could know at the time of the reorganization how many
Manville asbestos victims there would ultimately be.2 Indeed, Manville's
victims, and those of other companies that formerly produced asbestos, will
still be coming forward, in all likelihood, well into the twenty-first century.3
The Manville reorganization purportedly took into account the interests of
these so-called "future claimants"--persons whose identities and injuries could
not be known when the plan of reorganization was formulated and confirmed,
but who would certainly emerge as each victim's disease followed its course.4
The Trust was large. Manville5 and its insurance companies funded it with
approximately $5 billion in assets.6 Yet, after operating for less than two
1. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 732-33 (Bankr. E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(reviewing history of bankruptcy and reorganization of Johns-Manville Corporation and of Manville
Personal Injury Settlement Trust), vacated on other grounds, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), modified, 993
F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993).
2. 129 B.R. at 737-39, 751-52, 754.
3. Id. at 737.
4. Id. at 752-54.
5. In this Article, "Manville" refers to the enterprise of the Johns-Manville Corporation and its
successor, the Manville Corporation, which was created by the second amended and restated plan of
reorganization (the "Plan"). See id. at 752.
6. Under the Plan, the Trust was to receive the following distributions: (I) "insurance proceeds, cash
and accounts receivable with a total value of $869 million"; (2) "two bonds with an aggregate face value
of $1.8 billion and a $50 million installment note," payable in installments extending through November
of 2014; and (3) "up to 80 percent of the stock in the reorganized Manville Corporation-24 million shares
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years, the Trust was all but empty.' Notwithstanding its looming liability to
future claimants, the Trust paid virtually its whole value to the "present
claimants"-those persons who were sick at the time the court confirmed the
reorganization plan-and to their lawyers and the lawyers of the Trust.'
Federal courts in New York now face the Herculean task of restructuring the
Trust.9
Anxious to avoid the fate of Manville. twenty other companies that
formerly produced asbestos have recently structured a massive class action
settlement between themselves and a broadly defined class of persons who
were exposed to asbestos. Controversy over this settlement centers in part on
whether it adequately takes into account the interests of future claimants. The
settlement proposes to provide compensation to persons exposed to asbestos
through an administrative procedure that awards scheduled compensation to
persons suffering from defined categories of diseases.20 Deciding whether the
settlement treats the future claimants with fairness inevitably raises the
question of what fairness to the future claimants really means.
The vexing question of how to estimate total mass tort liability has also
haunted the recent silicon gel breast implant settlement." Representing the
largest product liability settlement in history, the agreement provides
approximately $4.25 billion to cover tort liability that is expected to emerge
over the next several years. '2 Some critics have already charged, however,
of common stock (representing fifty percent of Manville common stock outstanding at the time) plus
preferred stock ... convertible to an additional 72 million common shares (constituting an additional thirty
percent interest)." Id. The stock was subject to restrictions preventing the Trust from taking part in
management for some years. In addition to these assets, beginning in 1992. the Manville Corporation -was
to make payments to the Trust of up to twenty percent of its annual profits." Id at 752-53 Estimates of
the value of the Trust's funding vary.
7. Id. at 751-52; see also id. at 732. 754-62.
8. Id. at 758-59.
9. In re Joint Eastern & Southern District Asbestos iDtigation is a massise case in which Judge
Weinstein, sitting in combined bankruptcy and federal district court jurisdiction, attempted to restructure
the insolvent Manville Trust. In June 1991, Judge WVeinstein tried to restructure the Trust by approsing a
class action settlement agreement among the Trust and its beneficiaries. Most important, the restructuring
involved a reformulation of the payout policies of the Trust and Manville Corporation's additional
contribution of approximately $500 million to the Trust. The restructuring apparently unraseled when the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed Judge Weinstein's ruling on several points relating
to the representation of class and subclass members for purposes of FED. R. CIV P 23 i re Joint E &
S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992) (vacating previous settlement restructuring trust that
impermissibly used mandatory non-opt-out class action without proper subclasses and, to extent court s
action rested on bankruptcy jurisdiction, impermissibly modified a confirmed and substantially
consummated reorganization plan). The Second Circuit. however, subsequently reconsidered its ruling and
modified it, eliminating the requirement that subclasses defined by their place in the compensation queue
be represented in the settlement procedure. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.. 993 F2d 7 (2d Cir
1993). It remains to be seen whether the parties can formulate a plan under Judge \einstein's guidance
that satisfies both Rule 23 and federal bankruptcy law.
10. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods.. No. 93-0215. 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11358. at *72-193 (E.D
Pa. Aug. 16, 1994).
11. See In re Silicon Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig.. No CV 94-P-I 1558.S. 1994 U S Dist
LEXIS 12521 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994).
12. See $4.2 Billion Implant Settlement Is Approved, N.Y TIMEs, Sept. 2. 1994. at A20
1994]
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that the settlement fund is based on inadequate information and is certain to
treat claimants unequally. 13 If these critics are correct, later silicon implant
claimants may find themselves seeking relief from a trust fund as depleted as
the one that future Manville claimants will face.
Now is thus a good time to reexamine the approach to mass tort
bankruptcy that caused so dramatic a failure in the Manville case and that is
likely to do so again unless we change our thinking about mass tort bankruptcy
compensation. The problem of unfair treatment has relevance far beyond
Manville and mass tort bankruptcy. The Manville reorganization exemplifies
the unfairness of persons in the present taking for themselves resources that
ought to be reserved for the future. Many of the controversies of our time-the
use of natural resources and the preservation of the environment, 14 the status
of social security and other "entitlement" programs, 15 and the economic
effects of the national debt,'6  for example-involve the potential
misappropriation of resources rightfully belonging to future persons. While
many acknowledge collective obligations to future persons, the rules and
institutions needed to give these obligations more than lip service remain
poorly defined. 17 This Article addresses some of these issues in the context
13. See David Rynecki, Experts Wonder If Implant Settlement Is Good Enough, REUTER EUR. Bus.
REP., Sept. 2, 1994.
14. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. COLBY, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPMENT 9 (1990) (World
Bank Discussion Paper No. 80) (critiquing history of environmental policy); Marshall J. Breger ct al.,
Providing Economic Incentives in Environmental Regulation, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 463 (1991) (evaluating
use of economic incentives in environmental regulation); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-
Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. I (1991) (describing
market-based approaches to environmental regulation). Questions of present versus future interests enter
into environmental policy partly through the valuation of future costs and benefits. For an introduction to
cost-benefit analysis, see E.J. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (1976). For discussions of cost-benefit
analysis in environmental policy, see STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES? ECONOMISTS AND TIlE
ENVIRONMENT (1981); DAVID NV. PEARCE & R. KERRY TURNER, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1990).
15. See generally THE CRISIS IN SOCIAL SECURITY (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1977); THEODORE R.
MARMOR Er AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE (1990); ALICIA H. MUNNELL, THE FUTURE
OF SOCIAL SECURITY (1977); Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and
Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275 (1991); Erin E. Lynch, Comment, Late-Life Crisis: A
Comparative Analysis of the Social Insurance Schemes for Retirees of Japan, Germany, and the United
States, 14 COMP. LAB. L... 339 (1993); Jeffrey S. Lehman, To Conceptualize, To Criticize, To Defend, To
Improve: Understanding America's Welfare State, 101 YALE L.J. 685 (1991) (book review).
16. See generally DANIEL BELL & LESTER THUROW, THE DEFICITS: How BIG? How LONG? HOW
DANGEROUS? (1985); DAVID P. CALLEO, THE BANKRUPTING OF AMERICA: How THE FEDERAL BUDGErT
IS IMPOVERISHING THE NATION 11-25 (1992); ROBERT EISNER, How REAL IS THE FEDERAL DEFICIT?
(1986); John W. Ellwood, The Politics of the Enactment and Implementation of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings:
Why Congress Cannot Address the Deficit Dilemma, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 553 (1988); Michael Fitts &
Robert Inman, Controlling Congress: Presidential Influence in Domestic Fiscal Policy, 80 GEO. L.J. 1737
(1992); Philip G. Joyce & Robert D. Reischauer, Deficit Budgeting: The Federal Budget Process and
Budget Reform, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 429 (1992).
17. Private persons apparently acknowledge obligations both to their future selves and to their children.
Yet empirical evidence suggests individuals systematically undersave for their future selves. See Weiss,
supra note 15, at 1275. Perhaps our difficulty with fulfilling our collective obligation to future persons is
related to our individual tendency to fail our future selves. See also THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND
LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 232-41 (1986) (discussing individual tendency to take inadequate account
of future in relation to discharge of claims in bankruptcy law).
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of mass tort bankruptcy: What is a "fair" allocation to future claimants in a
mass tort bankruptcy? How can it be achieved? Why are current approaches
unfair?' These questions are important in their own right, and their answers
also shed light on issues of more global significance.
The first Part of this Article describes the general nature of the
distributional justice problem in mass tort bankruptcy. Part II analyzes the
institutional, psychological, and strategic factors that permit present claimants
in mass tort bankruptcy to secure a disproportionate share of the debtor's
assets for themselves.' 9 Part III proposes a novel structure for mass tort
bankruptcy reorganization. This proposal, which I call a "capital markets
approach," produces a fair distribution of the value of the debtor's assets
among present and future claimants by using the information-processing
capabilities of modern capital markets. At the heart of the capital markets
approach is a new kind of security-a security designed to be traded on the
capital market at a price that reflects a relatively efficient capital market's
estimate of how large the total tort liability of a mass tort debtor will be. The
fundamental insight of this Article is its proposal to substitute the superior
information-processing capabilities of capital markets for the more limited
capabilities of administrators. Part IV tentatively suggests how the capital
markets approach might be extended to cases where there is substantial
uncertainty about whether future tort liability renders a firm insolvent. Part V
is a brief conclusion.
I. THE FAIR DISTRIBUTION PROBLEM IN MASS TORT BANKRUPTCY
Mass tort bankruptcies create difficult problems of distributional justice.
Bankruptcy law addresses some distributional questions explicitly. The
bankruptcy priority rules, for example, mandate that certain classes of claims,
such as those of employees, have priority over others, such as those of
unsecured trade creditors. - While still somewhat controversial, several
18. These issues are most often discussed purely on a theoretical level. See. e.g. BRLCE ACKERMAN.
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 107-227 (1980) (discussing -justzce ocr tine"). Joits RAwLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 284-93 (1971) (discussing problem in influential chapter entitled 'The Problem of
Justice Between Generations"). Some interest in the more institutional aspects of the issue. how.cscr has
surfaced. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein. Justice Across the Generations. 67 TEX IL REV 1465 (1989)
(arguing that market institutions are usually best equipped to protect interests of future persons). Daniel A.
Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates. Later Generattons. and the
Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267 (1993) (providing good discussion of knotty problem of present
assessment of future value for policy purposes). Optimal use of nonrenewable resources. an analogous
problem, has long interested scholars. See. e.g.. Stephen F. Williams. Runiung Out The Problem of
Exhaustible Resources, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1978).
19. Under the Bankruptcy Code. "debtor'" refers to the person wsho invokes the protection of the
bankruptcy law. See II U.S.C. § 101(13) (Supp. V 1993).
20. See id. §§ 502. 503, 507. 725. 726 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (establishing fundamental pnonty
scheme in federal bankruptcy law). See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H JACKSOi. CASES.
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 693-99 (2d ed 1990).
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leading bankruptcy courts have suggested that present and future claimants in
mass tort bankruptcy should be treated equally in the bankruptcy reorganization
process." This principle of equality, however, is easier to state than to
implement. Strong forces militate against equal treatment of present and future
claimants, causing what I call the "fair distribution problem." To understand
how the problem arises, we must look briefly at some of the main institutions
and issues of mass tort bankruptcy.
A. Mass Tort Bankruptcies and Mass Tort Bankruptcy Trusts
Dividing the assets of a debtor in bankruptcy among various claimants is
especially difficult in the context of a mass tort bankruptcy. These difficulties
stem in part from the nature of certain mass torts. While courts can estimate
accurately the magnitude of harm caused by some mass torts soon after they
occur, other torts inflict harms of uncertain magnitudes, which apparently defy
judicial estimation. Bankruptcies caused by mass torts of the latter kind have
already become a permanent feature of modern economic and legal life. The
largest mass torts to date have been of this type.22 Mass torts of uncertain and
evolving magnitude will probably continue to occur, and perhaps even increase
in frequency. As economic markets grow to national and international scale,
products have the potential to harm significantly more people. Moreover, as
technology advances, it seems to harness energies and substances capable of
inflicting ever-greater harms over ever-longer periods.
Several mass tort bankruptcies in the last decade have involved massive
yet highly uncertain tort liability for future damages.23 An important issue for
21. In the asbestos-related bankruptcy case of In re UNR Industries, Inc., 29 B.R. 741 (Bankr. N.D.
III. 1983), the court refused to appoint a representative of the future claimants. In In re Amatex Corp., 30
B.R. 309 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983), however, the court's refusal to appoint a representative of future
claimants was reversed on appeal by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit
concluded that future claimants were "parties in interest" under the Bankruptcy Code. In re Amatex Corp.,
755 F.2d 1034, 1042-43 (3d Cir. 1985). In In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1984), the court appointed a representative of future claimants and criticized the approach taken in In re
UNR Industries. In Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1260
(1988), the court effectively included future claimants in mass tort bankruptcy reorganizations by treating
future claims as contingent claims to which reorganization plans could apply.
22. Examples include litigation involving Agent Orange, a defoilant used by the U.S. military in
Vietnam that may have caused cancer, genetic damage, and early death in Vietnam veterans, see, e.g., In
re 'Agent Orange' Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981); the
synthetic hormone diethylstilbestrol (DES), a drug administered to prevent miscarriage that caused cancer
in women who were exposed to the drug in utero, see, e.g., Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 744 F.2d 213 (1st
Cir. 1984); Mathis v. Eli Lilly & Co., 719 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1983); the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device
(IUD), a contraceptive that may have caused infections and other serious gynecological problems in women
using it, see, e.g., Setter v. A.H. Robins Co., 748 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1984); and asbestos, a fire-resistant
substance that has been found to cause lung cancer in individuals exposed to it, see, e.g., cased cited supra
note 21. For journalistic perspectives on the Dalkon Shield matter, see MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST:
CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, & THE DALKON SHIELD (1985); RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING TilE LAW:
THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1991).
23. See supra note 22.
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bankruptcy lawyers in the 1980's was whether persons whom past torts would
harm in the future, so-called "future claimants," actually had "claims" for the
purposes of bankruptcy law.2 4 Until their injuries manifested themselves, future
claimants were, after all, merely unidentified persons with hypothetical injuries.
Some leading bankruptcy courts have accorded future claimants a status in
bankruptcy proceedings by appointing legal representatives to guard their
interests and by ruling that reorganization plans can apply to future claims.2 ,
The Manville bankruptcy produced the landmark case in this regard. -' Other
courts have treated future claims as "contingent claims" cognizable in
bankruptcy proceedings.2 7
To lawyers, perhaps the most controversial aspect of the Manville
bankruptcy was its novel premise that the corporation was entitled to
bankruptcy protection not because it was insolvent, but because continuing
trends in asbestos litigation made a bankruptcy reorganization the best way to
manage the payment of present and future claims.2  Despite its novelty, the
premise of the Manville bankruptcy petition made sense as policy. It was
difficult to see how the problem of looming future liability could be fairly
solved outside of bankruptcy, whatever was the technical legal status of this
future liability. In making and allowing the petition, Manville and the courts
respectively seemed to acknowledge that if future claims were the basis for
invoking bankruptcy protection, then these claims should be accorded, as
nearly as possible, equal status in the bankruptcy proceedings.2' From the
outset, fair treatment of future claimants was a major justification for the
Manville bankruptcy. 0
24. See Anne Hardiman. Toxic Torts and Chapter II Reoruntzatton The Problen of Future C'liin.
38 VAND. L. REV. 1369 (1985); Margaret 1. Lyle. Note. Afass Thrt Clais and the Cuqorate forrfector
Bankruptcy Reorganization and Legislative Compensation lersus the ConsinonLa.m lort Si stern. 61 Tl \
L. REV. 1297, :328-36 (1983); Steven J. Parent. Comment. Jiuh tal Cret a in in )eahm,: isith , ts orilt
in Bankruptcy. 13 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 381 (1990)
25. See supra note 21.
26. Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp.. 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir 19889
27. See, e.g., Grady v. A.H. Robins. 839 F2d 198. 202-03 (4th Cir 1988
28. For an account of the controversy surrounding the Man% ile bankruptc) petition. ,ee I-rank R
Kennedy, Creative Bankruptcy? Use and Abuse of the Bankruptc i Lot% -Retle tton on Sone Recent ate('t.
71 IOWA L. REV. 199, 202-10 (1985).
29. In ruling that future claimants had a cognizable interest in the reorganization ol Man'ille. Judge
Lifland stated:
From the inception of this case, it has been obsvious to all concerned that the cr) purpose of
the initiation of these proceedings is to deal in sonte fashion %%ith claimants cipowed to the
ravages of asbestos dust who have not as of the lihng date manifested mplom,, of abestos
disease. Indeed, but for this continually evolving albeit amorphous constituen >. it is clear that
an otherwise economically robust Manville would not hase commenced these reorganization
proceedings.
In re Johns-Manville Corp.. 36 B.R. 743. 745 (Bankr. S.D N Y 1984) (citation omitted). at'd. 52 B R 940
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
30. See Kennedy. supra note 28. at 202-05. The problem of future claimant% in mas tor bankruptc>
has been clear for some time. Professor Frank Kennedy has obsersed that "the most critical problem in the
Manville reorganization case Iwasl how to deal with the claims of the %tctims of cposure %%ho [%%erel not
identifiable at the time the plan Iwas] filed." Kennedy continued "But hou can claims be paid shen the
The Yale Law Journal
The Manville bankruptcy created controversy for more than doctrinal
reasons. By invoking bankruptcy protections, Manville prevented present
claimants from enforcing their judgments against the company. With Manville
protected by the shield of bankruptcy, other companies that faced huge
liabilities from asbestos claimants feared that needy claimants would turn
increasingly on them. These "codefendants," as they are called in asbestos
litigation argot, argued vigorously that future liabilities were not "claims"
under the Bankruptcy Code.3 This argument had some legal merit. Before the
Manville bankruptcy, it was accepted doctrine that bankruptcy law provided
relief only from obligations that existed at the time of the bankruptcy
petition. 32 The codefendants argued that unrealized liability to future
claimants had no legal status, whatever its statistical probability. They
suggested that because bankruptcy "claims" include only legal obligations that
existed at the time of the bankruptcy petition, exposed persons did not have
bankruptcy "claims" until these persons had claims as a matter of state tort
law. Traditional bankruptcy doctrine thus presented a serious obstacle to using
bankruptcy procedures to allocate Manville's assets among present and future
tort claimants.
To solve this problem, the Manville bankruptcy court relied on the elastic
notion of a "party in interest" to a reorganization 33 and on the broad
injunctive power of bankruptcy courts. The court ruled that future claimants,
whether or not they had "claims" under bankruptcy law, constituted "parties
in interest" to the reorganization, and thus should be represented in the
reorganization proceeding." Accordingly, the court appointed a legal
representative for future claimants. The court also issued an injunction that
compelled all persons with asbestos-related personal injury claims, both present
and future, to bring those claims against the trust established by the plan, and
not against the new operating company that the plan had created to carry on
Manville's business.36 Consequently, "while the future claimants [were] not
given creditor status under the [Manville reorganization] Plan, they [were]
nevertheless treated identically to the present claimants by virtue of the
identity of the claimants and the nature and extent of their claims are not provable? The Bankruptcy
Reform Act did not anticipate this problem, and although the problem is now fully appreciated, no obvious
solution exists." Id. at 207 (footnote omitted). This Article provides, I believe, the best solution to this long-
standing problem.
31. "Claim" is defined at II U.S.C. § 101(5) (Supp. V 1993).
32. See, e.g., Matter of Morris, 12 B.R. 321,338 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1981) (stating that "bankruptcy acts
deal with debt which exists at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition"); see also Lines v.
Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970) (per curiam) (noting that purpose of bankruptcy is to give debtor fresh
start, "'unhampered"' by "'preexisting' debt) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
33. "Party in interest" has no specific definition in the Bankruptcy Code. Its meaning is determined
on an ad hoc basis. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. at 747.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 759.
36. See Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 640-41 (2d Cir. 1988).
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injunction, which channels all claims to the Trust."' 7 The reorganization plan,
by its terms, gave future claimants a putatively equal place in the
reorganization with creditors, and otherwise treated future claimants identically
to present claimants.38 The proclaimed goal of treating future claimants fairly
ran through the entire Manville proceedings, from the stated objectives of the
Manville petition to the affirmance of the Manville Plan on appeal.' 9
Mass tort bankruptcy thus has occasioned a practical revision of
bankruptcy law, allowing future claims to be addressed in reorganizat ion plans.
This doctrinal revision is closely tied to what will likely become the standard
mechanism for managing the compensation of mass tort bankruptcy claims: the
mass tort bankruptcy trust.40 Established pursuant to a plan of reorganization
or liquidation, this type of trust requires that the debtor place all or part of its
value in trust to compensate present and future tort claimants.' A board of
trustees administers the trust, paying off the tort claims in accordance with the
process set out in the bankruptcy plan. If an injunction "channels" all future
claims against the trust, it thereby insulates any successor operating company
from future liability, without courts ever having to confront the issue of
whether future tort liabilities are bankruptcy "claims." 2
37. Id. at 640.
38. While the court's use of the "'party in interest" concept and its broad posers of injunction allossed
it to avoid answering the vexing question of whether future claimants had "claims" for bankruptcy la%%
purposes, such an approach also allowed the court to avoid ruling on the relatisc priority of future 'claims"
and (legally uncontroversial) present claims. For a pereepti'e discussion of this point. see In re Penibone
Corp., 90 B.R. 918, 927-30 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988). While the courts hearing asbestos mass tort bankruptcy
cases have striven to provide future claimants equal participation in the negotiation process, they hac not
perforce enunciated a doctrine that future "claims" have equal priority with present claims under bankruptc,
law. They could not do so without altering the current bankruptcy definition of "clami"--a definition that
seems likely to exclude future "'claims."
Delaware has taken another approach to the problem of potentially inolhcnt corporations facing
uncertain future liability. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8. §§ 280-282 11991). see al5o In re Rego Co. 623
A.2d 92 (Del. Ch. 1992) (explaining and applying recent amendments to Delauare corporate code)
39. The court in Grady took a more direct approach. treating future claims as contingent claims
cognizable under § 101(4)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. See hi re A.H Robins Co. 63 B R 986, 989-94
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986). aff'd sub nom. Grady v. A.H. Robins Co.. 839 F2d 198 14th Cir 1988)
40. This is especially likely if Congress adopts proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Code See
S. 540, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 221 (1994). Under this amendment. Congress %ould effeciicly 'snte the
form of the Trust into the Bankruptcy Code as a vehicle for resolh ing mass tort bankruptcies The pro% ision
of such a statutory blueprint invites use of Manville-type trusts in the future, due in part to the adsantage
of the relative legal certainty that such a codification would afford
41. For a detailed description of the Manville Trust. see In re Joint E & S Dist Asbestos Ling. 129
B.R. 710, 752-62 (Bankr. E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated on other grounds. 982 F 2d 721 (2d Cir 1992).
modified, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993). For a description and appraisal of the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust
by a law professor who served as chairperson of the Trust. see Georgene M Vairo, he Dalkon Shield
Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost (or Found)?. 61 FORDiIAM L REv 617 (1992)
42. In Grady, the court confronted the issue more directly and ruled that future claini are contingent
claims in bankruptcy, with similar effect. See supra note 39 For a discussion of the issues raised by the
timing of claims under bankruptcy law, see Kevin J. Saville. Note. Dischargig CERCL4 Liabilv in
Bankruptcy: When Does a Claim Arise?. 76 MINN. L Ri-v 327. 337-49 (1991)
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The bankruptcy plan itself is the product of negotiation among the debtor,
creditors, other interested parties, and equity holders.43 It details both the
general structure and the particular procedures the trustees will use to realize
the value of the debtor's assets and to distribute this value among tort and
other claimants. To reduce the high litigation costs characteristic of mass tort
bankruptcies, these trusts may employ alternative dispute resolution and other
techniques to determine the value of claims."
A stylized example will illustrate how a mass tort bankruptcy trust works.
Suppose a firm with assets worth $2 billion tortiously releases a toxin into the
environment that causes damages having a present value of $3 billion. As the
assets of the firm are worth less than the present value of its tort liability, the
firm is insolvent.4 5 Suppose further that $2 billion of the expected tort claims
belong to present claimants. This means that the court and the parties can now
identify claimants who have damages in an amount equal to the current value
of the firm's assets. The remaining $1 billion in claims belong to persons who
do not yet know that they have been harmed, who are not yet sick, or who
have not yet filed suit against the firm. These persons are future claimants.
Assuming there are no other creditors, the firm should use its entire value of
$2 billion to satisfy the claims of its present tort claimants. Under the
bankruptcy rule of absolute priority, the debtor will pay equity holders nothing,
43. Bankruptcy plans are products of negotiation in all events. See generally Lynn M. LoPueki &
William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly
Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125 (1990) (reporting results of four-year empirical study of
bankruptcy reorganizations of large, publicly held companies and concluding, inter alia, that negotiation
rather than adjudication determined outcome of cases in study).
44. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There Need for an Administrative
Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819 (1992); Elinor P. Schroeder, Legislative and Judicial Responses
to the Inadequacy of Compensation for Occupational Disease, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 151 (1986).
45. While firms that voluntarily petition for bankruptcy are often insolvent in either the "bankruptcy"
or "equity" sense, they need not be. The enactment of the new Bankruptcy Code in 1978 eliminated any
requirement that a voluntary petitioner be insolvent in the "bankruptcy," or "balance-sheet," sense of its
liabilities exceeding its assets, or insolvent in the "equity" sense of being unable to pay its obligations as
they come due. Compare I I U.S.C. § 301 (1988) (establishing that voluntary bankruptcy case commences
with filing of petition by debtor) with the old Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. §§ 205(a), 404, 530, 723, 823,
1023 (1970) (requiring debtor in case under Chapters VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XiIl to be insolvent or unable
to pay debts as they came due). The debtor, however, must file a bankruptcy petition in "good faith." See,
e.g., In re 2218 Bluebird Ltd. Partnership, 41 B.R. 540, 542-43 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1984) ("[11 U.S.C. §1
1112(b) does not expressly require a petition for relief under Chapter II to be filed in good faith....
However,... there is an implied requirement of good faith when filing any bankruptcy petition.") (citations
omitted); see also Robert L. Ordin, The Good Faith Principle in the Bankruptcy Code: A Case Study, 38
Bus. LAW. 1795 (1983). Creditors can put debtors in bankruptcy involuntarily if the debtor is generally not
paying its debts as they become due or a custodian has been appointed or has taken possession of
substantially all of the debtor's property within 120 days prior to the date of filing. I I U.S.C. § 303(h)(1),
(2) (1988). In this Article, I generally assume that mass tort firms voluntarily petitioning for bankruptcy.
or against which an involuntary petition has been filed, would be insolvent in the bankruptcy sense. I
advocate applying the approach outlined in Part IV.B infra to any mass tort firm that voluntarily petitions
in good faith for bankruptcy protection, or has been involuntarily placed in bankruptcy because of its
equitable insolvency, where there is substantial uncertainty concerning its bankruptcy insolvency.
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because tort creditors, as general unsecured creditors, have a claim prior to that
of equity on the value of the debtor's assets."
The value of the debtor firm may be realized in several ways. If the
bankruptcy firm is in Chapter 11, the debtor firm might reorganize by
canceling its old stock and conveying its assets to a new entity. In our
example, this new entity in turn would issue all of its stock to the mass tort
bankruptcy trust established by the reorganization plan. The trust could sell the
stock, keep the stock and collect dividends, borrow funds using the stock as
collateral, or engage in other transactions in order to raise money for the
satisfaction of present and future tort claims. 7
46. See generally BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 20. at 957-99 (introducing and describing absolute
priority rule in corporate reorganization). Bankruptcy plans frequently deviate from absolute priority in
practice. Commentators have explored this phenomenon extensively. See generally' John D Ayer.
Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers. 87 Micti. L. REV. 963 (1989) (describing Supreme Court
adherence to statutory, rather than constitutional, interpretation of absolute phont) rule and ,uggesting lack
of controlling theory in this area); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson. Bargaiing After the Fall and
the Contours of the Absolute Priorit Rule. 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 738 (1988) (reexamining premises of
absolute priority rule from perspective of negotiation process): Raymond T Ninmrer. Negotiated
Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute Priority and New Value Contributions. 36 ExIORY Li 1009
(1987) (arguing that individual debtors should be given more protection than corporate shareholders under
Bankruptcy Code); Jerold B. Warner, Banknptc.. Absolute Priortr. and the Pricing of Risk) Debt Claes.
4 J. FIN. ECON. 239 (1977) (finding that capital market properly prices risk) debt claims to reflect
possibility of departure from absolute priority rule); Lawrence A. Weiss. Bankr ptcs Resolution Direct
Costs and Violation ofPriority of Clainrs. 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285 (1990) (presenting ev dence on direct costs
of bankruptcy and violation of absolute priority rule). Mass tort bankruptcy is no exception See Mansilic
Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm. (ht re Johns-Manville Corp.). 66 B.R 517. 531-33 tBankr S D N Y
1986). Judge Lifland at one point castigated a group of equity holders for their "'buccancenng distregard
for their status in this reorganization." Id. at 533. But see LoPueki & Whitford. supra note 43 (suggcsting
deviations from absolute priority rule are usually not large).
47. Ideally, the mass tort trust fund should be funded by an effective liquidation of the rnas'. tort firm
This could be accomplished in Chapter II (using an approach like that used in the Man% ile reorganizationP
or through a Chapter 7 liquidation, or provided for specifically in a new chapter of the BankruptcN Code
dedicated to mass tort bankruptcy. In Manville. the Plan transferred the businc.s to a nes% enti) and
compelled the new entity to issue most of its stock to the mass tort trust. Unfortunatel). the Plan misscd
the next important step. It forbade the Trust from selling its Manville stock. therebs entrenching Mans ,lle
management and underdiversifying the Trust.
A mass tort trust should sell any mass tort firmi stock i%,ued to it and purchase nsk-frce s untes
with the proceeds. A plan could also finance the trust by liquidating the corporation piecemeal. it ,uch a
liquidation would maximize the trust's value. Commentators have expressed concern that liquidation of an
insolvent firm will realize less than its full value. as the firm's assets would be %old in a "lire sale " See
David A. Skeel, Jr.. Markets. Courts. and the Brave New World of Bankrupt"s Theors. 1993 Wis L RLu
465, 477, 481. I believe these concerns can be dealt with adequately by using auction procedures deigned
to assure that equity in the reorganized debtor or the debtor's as.sets are sold to the highest bidder In
auctions for corporate control, overbidding is common. See RONALD J. GILsO. & B.R-,ARD S BL..K. Tit
LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 591-92 (Supp. 1993) (summarizing literature concerning
overbidding); see also Bernard S. Black. Bidder Overpaviment in Takeovers. 41 STA, L Re,% 597. 59
)
(1989) ("[Flor many takeovers, target shareholders gain partly because the bidder pa).' too much "r While
I believe prospective tort claimants would prefer that mass tort trusts be funded with nsk-free secunties
from the outset, rather than stock in a reorganized debtor. one could still use the latter approach. elling
the stock in the reorganized debtor either immediately before the trust wvas liquidated or gradually oser the
life of the trust. The latter approach would be preferable if immediate liquidation uould ,o great)
undervalue the firm that even risk-averse prospective tort claimants would prefer to asoid the
undervaluation, even though it left them with claims on a risk%, underdiersilied portfolio I assume in thls
Article that the trust is funded by an effective liquidation of the firm. that all lir salue is transferred to
the trust, and that the trust invests its monies i risk-free securities. Since the trust could issue to equity
holders trust shares junior to those of tort claimants, this assumption does not necessarily require that equity
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However the trust is funded, its designers and administrators face the grave
problem of securing a fair distribution of the value of the debtor's estate
among present and future claimants. In our stylized example, the legal
representative of future claimants would successfully insist, and the bankruptcy
court would confirm, that the mass tort trust reserve one-third of the value of
the debtor's assets for the satisfaction of future claims. As future claimants will
suffer one-third of the harm caused by the tort, reserving this portion of the
value of the debtor's assets for their compensation would accord them pro rata
treatment with present claimants. That is, on a dollar-for-dollar basis, the
claims of present claimants and of future claimants would be treated equally.
In our example, the value of the debtor's estate and the magnitude of tort
liability are such that for every dollar of tort claim, each tort claimant will
receive about 67 cents in compensation, assuming zero transaction costs and
assuming all claimants are to receive the same proportional satisfaction of their
claims. Reserving one-third of the debtor firm's value (about $667 million) for
future claimants will assure that future claimants also receive 67 cents for each
dollar of their claims. In this sense, the trust will treat present and future
claimants equally.
This equal treatment conforms to a fundamental norm of bankruptcy law,
which I call the "equal-treatment norm." In bankruptcy, creditors of the same
class are to have their claims equally impaired if the bankruptcy plan does not
provide for their claims to be satisfied fully.48 In practice future claimants are
likely to get far less than equal treatment. This disparity is the result of the fair
distribution problem, which I discuss in detail below.49 Before explaining why
achieving a fair distribution among present and future claimants in mass tort
bankruptcy is problematic, however, I must explain why the equal distribution
described above is actually fair. This discussion is particularly important
because courts have not exp!icitly analyzed what constitutes fair treatment of
future claimants when full compensation of all injuries by the debtor is
impossible.
B. Defining Fair Distribution in the Mass Tort Bankruptcy Setting
In recent years, legal theorists and others have made frequent use of
hypothetical contract analysis when attempting to resolve issues of fairness.5"
holders receive no value. See infra part IW.A.
48. See II U.S.C. § I 123(a)(4) (1988) (requiring reorganization plan to provide same treatment for
each claim within class); id. § 1124 (defining impairment of claim under reorganization plan); see tlso
Vladimir Jelisavic, Note, Trading Claims Against Chapter II Debtors: Disclosure as the Criterion for the
Less Favorable Treatment Standard of Section 1123(a)(4), 17 J. CORP. L. 385, 386-91 (1992) (explaining
general goals and policies of Chapter I1).
49. See infra part II.
50. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 18, at 11-17; Thomas Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism,
in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 103 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982). Alan Schwartz
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The hypothetical contract approach asks whether individuals would have
agreed to a given treatment of their claims if their agreement had been
solicited in a setting characterized by possession of appropriate information,
low transaction costs, and freedom from morally arbitrary influences."'
Applying this approach to mass tort bankruptcy entails determining the
distribution of the mass tort firm's assets to which prospective tort claimants
would agree in this hypothetical setting.52 Hypothetical contract analysis
derives its justificatory force from the value of autonomy-it prescribes rules
to which rational individuals, deprived of morally irrelevant information, would
subscribe.53
This approach has attractive features. Tort creditors choosing distributional
rules in the factual setting of an actual mass tort bankruptcy would behave
strategically, choosing the rules most likely to favor themselves. Hypothetical
contract analysis deprives prospective tort creditors of knowledge about the
particular facts of a given bankruptcy-knowledge that would allow them to
tailor their choice of a distribution process to satisfy their own interests.
Prospective tort creditors should select a process for distributing assets that is
provides a good summary of hypothetical choice analysis in Proposals for Products iDabilav Reform A
Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353. 357-61 (1988); see also Robert P. Bums, Rawls and tile
Principles of Welfare Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 184 (1989) (assessing applicability of Rawlsian hypothetical
contract analysis to American income-maintenance policies); David Chamy. Hypotlietical Bargains The
Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815 (1991) (discussing problems ansing
in construction of hypothetical bargains); Robert A. Long. Jr.. Note, A Theory of Hypothetical Contract,
94 YALE L.J. 415 (1984) (proposing theory of hypothetical contract to govem common law of restitution
for unsolicited benefits).
51. See RAWLS, supra note 18, at 136-42.
52. Hypothetical bargain analysis has, of course. been applied to bankruptcy law See JACKsO%. 1upra
note 17, at 7-19 (describing bankruptcy law as solution to common pool problem that creditors would have
agreed to ex ante were transaction costs lower). I do not. however. mean to commit myself to a
hypothetical contract view of all bankruptcy law, in part because I find telling Barry E Adler's criticisms
of this approach in Financial and Political Theortes of American Corporate Bankrupics. 45 STAy. L REV
311 (1993). Nevertheless, hypothetical contract analysis is the best approach uhere actual contracting is
impossible, as it obviously is in the involuntary transactional setting of torts. I am also uncomfortable with
approaches that seek to make bankruptcy law the servant of more global object'.cs of social justice See,
e.g., Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy. 91 COLLm L REv 717
(1991) (describing "value-based account" of bankruptcy law that addresses social Justice concerns). Robert
K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice. 1994 U ILL L REV I
(explaining how economic approach to bankruptcy law is consistent with Rawlstan conception of social
justice). Treatment of involuntary creditors raises fairness issues that do not apply to voluntary creditors,
the case for using hypothetical contract analysis for the former is independent of that for using the approach
for all bankruptcy law.
53. For a critical evaluation of hypothetical contract arguments used by law and economics writers,
see Daniel Brudney, Hypothetical Consent and Moral Force. 10 LAw & PHIL_ 235 (1991) 1 take my use
of hypothetical contract analysis to be consistent with the ex ante Paretio-opimality criterion often used in
economic analysis of law. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Thomas S Ulen. An Economic Case for
Comparative Negligence, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067 (1986). I prefer to use a faimess criterion rather than
efficiency because tort compensation, perhaps unlike other allocational policies. see id at 1095. seems
primarily to involve issues of fairness. Hal Varian has developed another appealing conception of fairness
See Hal R. Varian. Two Problems in the Theory of Fairness. 5 J. PLn. ECON. 249 (1976). see also Ronald
Dworkin, What is Equality? (pts. I & 2). 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185. 283 (1981) While applying this
standard to my proposal is beyond the scope of this Article. I believe my proposal would pass muster under
these sorts of fairness criteria, assuming they may be applied to narrowly focused policies
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consistent with their interests, but only as they conceive of their interests
independently of the particular facts of a given bankruptcy. After a mass tort,
some tort victims may manifest injuries immediately, while others may not
know they have been injured until much later. Tort claimants who knew they
were injured would insist on a bankruptcy regime biased in favor of present
claimants; they would not consent to a distributional rule that impaired their
claims for the sake of future claimants. In a hypothetical contract setting, while
persons might know that they were exposed to mass tort risk, they would not
know whether they would be present or future claimants if a mass tort
bankruptcy actually occurred. Under these circumstances, assuming that
prospective tort creditors are normally risk averse, prospective tort creditors
would not agree to an allocational scheme that paid present claimants more
than future claimants; rather, they would select a scheme that treated present
and future claimants equally.
The assumption of risk aversion, while significant, is plausible.54 Risk
aversion is necessary to the argument for equal treatment of present and future
claimants because risk-neutral rule choosers would be indifferent between a
compensation scheme that favored some subgroup of claimants and a scheme
that treated subgroups equally, so long as the expected value of compensation
under each scheme was the same. I take hypothetical rule choosers to be risk
averse, as hypothetical contract arguments usually do, for three main reasons.
First, as an empirical matter, risk aversion seems to be a nearly universal
human quality. Second, for hypothetical contract analysis to have any
normative force, the hypothetical contract setting must be stripped of morally
irrelevant features. Individuals' wealth endowments seem to fall into the
category of the morally irrelevant; consequently, rule choosers cannot assume
they are at any particular wealth level. Now, because the marginal value of
additional wealth decreases as wealth increases, rule choosers will be risk
averse; they will prefer an egalitarian compensation scheme that guarantees a
certain level of compensation to an inegalitarian scheme that provides a
variable level of compensation.56
54. See PAUL SCHOEMAKER, EXPERIMENIS ON DECISIONS UNDER RISK: TlE EXPECTED UTILIrY
HYPOTHESIS 45-90, 109-25 (1980); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, ProspeLt Theor.: An Analysis
of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
55. See RAWLS, supra note 18, at 136-38.
56. Even if we assume that hypothetical rule choosers are ignorant of their wealth endowments.
arriving at the equal-treatment norm requires us to assume further either that the rules apply only to torts
that inflict significant harm on their victims, or that individuals are indifferent as to whether the rules that
apply to small losses favor the risk averse. This consideration is worth mentioning because even persons
ignorant of their wealth endowments might be risk neutral regarding the selection of compensation schemes
for very small injuries. A firm, after all, might be driven into bankruptcy by inflicting $10 of damage on
every person in the country. Even persons ignorant of their wealth, however, might be indifferent between
a scheme that would compensate them, say, $1 for this harm, or give them a one-in-five chance of getting
$5. As the rule choosers are merely selecting the specialized rules for compensating mass tort bankruptcy
claimants, not those determining the basic structure of society, it is appropriate for them to know what
social safety nets will be in place, and this knowledge will tend to vitiate the extreme risk aversion that
[Vol. 104: 367
19941 Mass Tort Bankruptcy 381
A third, more speculative reason for taking prospective tort creditors to be
risk averse is suggested by the idea that tort victims are involuntary creditors
of the bankrupt debtor. It seems clear that the involuntary nature of the tort
transaction makes hypothetical contract analysis appropriate, as there is no
actual contract to analyze. However, the involuntariness of the transaction
might also make it more likely that the persons involved-prospective tort
claimants-will be risk averse with respect to the compensation scheme they
would choose. The tort victims' extension of credit, because it is involuntary,
will probably distort the risk characteristics of the total portfolios (including
human capital) of tort victims, causing an increase in the overall riskiness of
those portfolios. Whatever a person's risk preferences may be, she will have
invested her human and other capital in a manner consistent with those
preferences before the tort occurs, since risk preferences, like other
preferences. are revealed by one's behavior.5' A tort typically depletes
partially or completely the victim's liquid assets, as she must pay for medical
expenses, substitute for lost wages. and otherwise compensate for the loss. The
cash and cash substitutes depleted by the tort-those that are most liquid and
hence most available for emergency use-will tend to be the parts of a
person's portfolio that decrease its riskiness. Thus, substituting a mass tort
bankruptcy claim, in effect an "IOU" from an insolvent tortfeasor, for cash and
near-cash equivalents in the victim's portfolio will increase the riskiness of that
portfolio, whether or not the portfolio was previously that of a highly or
slightly risk-averse person. A mass tort's impairment of human capital, in the
form of the ability to earn a wage, similarly increases the riskiness of a
person's portfolio.
This perspective suggests that prospective tort victims will be more risk
averse with respect to the form of tort compensation they prefer, at least
regarding nontrivial injuries, than the total asset mix of their pre-tort portfolios
would indicate. To the extent bankruptcy compensation rules make mass tort
claims less risky, they will tend to mitigate this distortion in the risk
arguably characterizes the Rawlsian original position. %%here the basic structure is at stake Neetnhlcss.
the assumption that the mass torts with which %%e are concerned are only those that significantly harm at
least some individuals does not seem particularly troubling. In mass torts %%here all affected indi%,duals are
only slightly injured, much simpler and cheaper compensator% sclictes (such as first-come. first-sctied or
even a lottery) might pass muster. It seems intuitively obvious that higher standards of fairness must apply
to compensation schemes that determine how a limited fund will be div ided to compensate senously injured
individuals where not all of them can be compensated full%. There is no apparent theoretical reason.
moreover, why the same rule must be chosen for mass torts that inflict large aggregate harms, but hurt no
one person very much. and the more troubling mass torts %%here many persons are harmued sCnously
Indeed, the different treatment of these two sorts of mass torts is less an objectionable inconsistency in my
approach than an appropriate moral distinction that hypothetical contract analysis models %%ell The rule
choosers probably would choose different compensatory ,chemes for lo%%-grade-nuisancc mass torts and
mass torts that inflict serious individual injunes. This Article concerns itself %tth the compensation in the
mass tort bankruptcy setting for the latter type of tort.
57. See TIBOR SCITOVSKY. TIiE JOYLESS ECONOMY 72-75 (1976). Paul A Samuelson. Consumptwn
Theory in Terms of Revealed Preferences. 15 ECONOMs-rRICA 242 (1948)
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characteristics of the portfolios of the tort victims. Prospective tort creditors
thus will prefer less risky to more risky forms of tort compensation, even if
their pre-tort portfolios identified them (or some of them) as only slightly risk-
averse persons. 58 It follows that we need assume only that individuals will be
slightly risk averse-that is, risk averse enough to engage in some
diversification of their total wealth, including human capital, such that a
significant involuntary conversion of the less risky portions of their portfolios
into the presumptively quite risky form of mass tort bankruptcy claims would
make their total portfolios more risky than they were before the conversion.
Thus, hypothetical contract analysis indicates that, for mass tort
bankruptcies that involve serious injuries to at least some claimants, fairness
requires equal treatment of claimants regardless of the timing of their claims.
This result, I believe, is consistent with the moral intuitions of most people
who have reflected on these issues.
II. ORIGINS OF THE FAIR DISTRIBUTION PROBLEM
Even though prospective tort claimants in a hypothetical contract setting
would prefer a compensation scheme that treats present and future claimants
equally, current mass tort bankruptcy practice favors present claimants over
future claimants, distributing to present claimants a disproportionate share of
the debtor's assets. This inequality stems from incentives deeply rooted in the
institutions of mass tort bankruptcy. We can best understand the
disproportionate distribution to present claimants by considering a stylized
example of a mass tort bankruptcy reorganization.
As in the example above,59 suppose a mass tort firm, whose assets are
worth $2 billion, releases a toxin into the environment that causes damages
having a present value of $3 billion. The firm is insolvent. Suppose further that
$2 billion of the $3 billion in expected tort claims belong to present claimants.
The remaining $1 billion will manifest itself over the ten years following the
bankruptcy procedure; currently it is impossible to know who will suffer these
injuries. A mass tort trust should reserve one-third of the firm's total value for
future claimants in order to make a fair distribution. Under realistic conditions,
however, present claimants, favored by psychological and other factors, will
press for a reorganization or liquidation that allocates the entire or nearly the
entire value of the debtor firm to them.
58. Any risk-neutral prospective tort claimants will presumably be indifferent as to whether tort
compensation takes a more or less risky form, so we need not concern ourselves with them.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
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A. Factors Affecting Allocational Decisions
Factors that give rise to the fair distribution problem can be placed in
several categories. First are psychological factors that operate to favor present
over future claimants, quite apart from any self-interested or strategic motives
of the parties. Second are incentives of attorneys and judges in the bankruptcy
process that encourage the negotiation of plans that favor present over future
claimants. Third and most serious is the strategic disadvantage at which future
claimants find themselves vis-A-vis present claimants and equity holders.
1. Psychological Factors
Present claimants have powerful psychological advantages over future
claimants in their battle to maximize their share of the debtor's estate. Present
claimants in mass tort bankruptcies are identifiable persons with urgent medical
and financial needs, while future claimants are only statistical probabilities.
Empirical psychology suggests that decisionmakers give excessive weight to
concrete and vivid information before them at the expense of more abstract
information that should be given equal weight in a rational decisionmaking
process. This phenomenon is called the "vividness effect. ' The vividness
effect makes it difficult for the legal representative of abstract future claimants
to persuade the court to leave unsatisfied the needs of present claimants so that
future claimants may be treated equally. 6 I This psychological factor also
disposes a bankruptcy court to underestimate the number and size of future
60. See RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross. HUMAN INI-RLCE STRATEGIES AD SIIORTCOMINGS OF
SOCIAL JUDGMENT 59-61 (1980); Eugene Borgida & Richard E Nisbett. The Differential lmpact of
Abstract vs. Concrete Information on Decisions. 7 J. APPLIED SOc PSYCIOL. 258 (1977). Richard E
Nisbett & Eugene Borgida, Attribution and the Ps'.chologs of Prediction. 32 J PERSOALrrY & SOC
PSYCHOL. 932 (1975); Richard E. Nisbctt et al. Popular Induction: Informatiwn Is Not Necessarily
Informative, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 113 (John S. Carroll & John W Payne cds. 1976).
David L. Rosehan. Psychological Realities and Judicial PolicY. 19 ST'A%. LANw. 10. 13-1a (1984)
(discussing "vividness effect"); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman. Judgment Under Uncertants:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974). reprnted in JLDGM_.E.NT UNDER UNcCRTI'ATY
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.. 1982). But see Shelley E, Taylor & Suzanne C.
Thompson, Stalking the Elusive "Vividness" Effect. 89 PSYCIIOL. REV. 155 (1982) (concluding that
"vividness effect" is difficult to verify empirically).
61. Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbttt argue that pro rata compensation of tort victims may be
undesirable if all victims would consequently be underrompensated. Saving identifiable victims at the
expense of unidentified victims helps preserve the societal myth that life is pnceless See GtIDO CALABRESI
& PHILIP BOBBrIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 43-45 (1978). Decisions of this kind. however. are more convenient
than tragic. By favoring present over future claimants. policymaker act expediently Future tort victims
do not vote or protest and thus make better victims. To call this "tragic" seems inaccurate Aristotle
recognized that tragedy possessed an element of necessity, perhaps with a connotation of sacnfice. See
ARISTOTLE, POETICS 1449B (S.H. Butcher trans.. 1951). But the "sacnrfice" of the interests of future tort
victims for the sake of the present tort victims is only inevitable if the interests of present v icttms must be
maximized.
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claims so that the bankruptcy plan can award present claimants something
closer to adequate compensation.62
2. Judicial and Attorney Incentives
Empirical evidence suggests that bankruptcy courts tend to overvalue
reorganized firms, resulting in at least the temporary illusion that the
reorganization gives all creditors and interested parties some reasonable value
for their claims.63 Underestimating the value of future claims creates the
appearance that all claimants will be reasonably if not fully compensated, an
illusion that may last long enough to support judicial confirmation of the plan
and the clearing of the court's docket.
Present claimants typically have claims that juries or settlement agreements
have already liquidated or will liquidate in the foreseeable future. Future
claims, by contrast, are often highly uncertain and likely to remain so for
extended periods. To estimate future claims, administrative processes must
consider many factors that bear on the ultimate magnitude of future claims. To
estimate future mass tort liability, an administrative process must determine,
for example, how many future claimants there will be, what diseases they will
suffer, what medical treatments they will require, and so on. Each of these
decisions offers a point of entry for present claimants to argue their position:
Respecting the issues above, for example, they would argue "not very many,"
"mild diseases," and "inexpensive treatments." The more complex the
methodology of estimation, the more opportunities interested parties have to
influence the outcome. Estimating future mass tort liability involves an
extremely complex methodology and accords present claimants many
opportunities to advance their interests.
62. Professor Mark Roe apparently thinks this tendency to favor present claimants is benign. He writes
that "[flirst-come, first-served distribution has great appeal where the claimants have little control over
when to assert their claims," and that "a decisive argument for early reorganization to provide temporal
equality in compensation cannot be unambiguously derived from fairness principles." See Mark J. Roe,
Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 855 (1984) (footnotes omitted). My thesis is obviously
at odds with Roe's on this score, since I have argued that temporal equality can be derived from fairness
principles. See supra part I.B. Roe's reasoning on this point seems faulty. He notes the willingness of
society to spend great sums of money on present victims at the expense of future victims, see Roe. supra,
at 855, but this hardly constitutes an endorsement. As I have argued, there is good reason for thinking that
favoring present over future claimants is mere bias. Moreover, it is a mistake to identify policymakers,
especially those in the arcane world of mass tort bankruptcy, with "society," even if we take as given the
doubtful thesis that the social will should control on matters of distributional justice, in which certain
subsets of society are likely to be treated unfairly. Furthermore, bargain analysis is applicable, contrary to
Roe's claim. Id. It is precisely because the actual facts of mass tort bankruptcy create a bias in favor of
present claimants that we must resort to hypothetical bargain analysis, and ask to what parties would agree
under fair circumstances.
63. See, e.g., Walter J. Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. Ct. L.
REV. 565, 577-78 (1950); J. Ronald Trost, Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations: For the Benefit of
Creditors or Stockholders?, 21 UCLA L. REV. 540, 544-46 (1973).
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When juries determine the damages of present claimants, moreover, they
do so independently, without regard to the effect their decisions will have on
future claimants. The parties' decision to reserve funds for future claimants in
the bankruptcy process, by contrast, must deliberately deprive present claimants
of needed funds. In determining the value of future claims for purposes of a
bankruptcy plan, the parties engage in a dependent process that simultaneously
decides what will be available for present tort claimants and for other creditors.
The dependency tends to distort the valuation decision and invites compromise
by the future claimants' representative. The independence of juries and
settlement procedures for present claimants, on the one hand, and the
dependency of decisions to set aside funds for future claimants, on the other,
makes the net result of these decisions especially vulnerable not only to the
vividness effect discussed above, but also to pressure tactics available to
parties in the bankruptcy process.
The attorneys who represent present claimants receive a substantial
percentage of the settlements they reach with, or the verdicts they obtain
against, the debtor.' Future claimants, however, are typically represented by
a guardian appointed by the bankruptcy court.6 Wanting their dockets
cleared, courts may tend to appoint guardians who are excessively
accommodating.6 6 These guardians are not compensated by a percentage of the
debtor's assets that they secure for their clients. They thus lack the economic
incentive that plaintiffs' attorneys have to seek the maximum attainable
settlement.
3. Strategic Bargaining in the Bankruptcy Process
Perhaps most important, future claimants are at a strategic disadvantage in
the bargaining that characterizes the bankruptcy process. The only monitor of
the performance of the future claimants' representative is the court itself,
whose incentive is less to ensure that future claimants receive the maximum
possible or even a fair share, than it is to ensure that the parties reach some
agreement. Both present claimants and equity holders of the debtor have a
common interest in a reorganization or liquidation plan that undervalues future
claims. In the example above, the debtor firm had a value of $2 billion and tort
64. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Ling.. 129 BR. 710. 810-II. 864-65 (Bankr E &
S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated on other grounds. 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992). modified. 993 F2d 7 (2d Cir
1993).
65. See supra note 21.
66. See Michael D. Ricciuti, Equity and Accountabilit in the Reform of Settlement Prrwedures in .%la.s
Tort Cases: The Ethical Duty To Consult. I GEo. J. LEGA. EThics 817 (1988) (arguing that judges'
eagerness in approving settlement of class actions in order to clear dockeis may result in careles
decisionmaking); see also Jonathan R. Macey. The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare
Decisis, 65 CM.-KENT L. REV. 93. 94 (1989) (noting that among factors that motivate judges is desire to
maximize leisure time).
1994]
The Yale Law Journal
claims of $3 billion, consisting of $2 billion in present and $1 billion in future
claims. A mass tort reorganization that treated present and future claimants
equally and observed absolute priority would place the entire value of the
debtor's assets in trust for all tort claimants.67 Equity holders would oppose
such a plan, however, and would not hesitate to use the weapon of delay to
prevent its creation.68
Equity holders have a strong incentive to employ dilatory tactics because
of the fundamental nature of their financial claim on the firm's assets. Because
of its low priority, equity in a bankrupt firm would usually be worthless if the
firm were liquidated promptly upon its bankruptcy in order to satisfy creditors.
The value of the equity is the total value of the firm minus the amount owed
to creditors. Equity holders can in effect buy the firm back from creditors by
paying off the firm's debts. Thus the equity may be viewed as an option to
buy the unleveraged firm (the firm free of debt) from the creditors, where the
price is equal to the amount necessary to satisfy obligations to the creditors.
The value of this "call option" on the bankrupt firm is a function of several
factors, most notably its maturity, or the time at which it must be exercised or
left to expire unexercised.69 Standard option pricing models also indicate this
intuitively clear proposition: A call option that is currently "out of the money,"
that is, the right to buy an asset at a price currently above its market value, is
worth more the further in the future the exercise date is. Although a firm is
currently worth less than its debts, it may be worth more than its debts in the
future, making the options on the firm-its equity-worth something. The
longer the period of time during which equity holders can wait to see whether
the firm's value increases, the more equity is worth. When a firm is bankrupt,
therefore, equity holders have everything to gain and nothing to lose from
delaying the completion of bankruptcy and the paying off of creditors. Indeed,
to the extent shares in insolvent firms are traded, their price should reflect the
prospect that the conclusion on bankruptcy will be delayed. 0
67. The value of the assets could be realized by a going-concern liquidation, or by canceling the old
equity and distributing 100% of the equity in the reorganized firm to the trust, which could then sell it into
the market. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. Cf. Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for
Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986) (arguing that maximization of value for
creditors would be better achieved by going-concern liquidation of debtor than by reorganization). The trust
would then allocate the proceeds in accordance with the terms of the trust.
68. See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 448 (1992)
(analyzing strategic uses of delay by equity and junior creditors in bankruptcy).
69. See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL.
ECON. 637 (1973); see also Robert C. Merton, Theory of Rational Option Pricing, 4 BELL J. ECON. 141
(1973).
70. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate
Reorganization, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 253, 255-56 (1992) (arguing that delay enhances equity
holders' option value and is strategically valuable in negotiations over reorganization plan); Yaacov Z.
Bergman & Jeffrey L. Callen, Opportunistic Underinvestment in Debt Renegotiation and Capital Structure,
29 J. FIN. ECON. 137 (1991) (explaining how management can use control over debtor to extract
concessions from creditors by threatening to make bad investments); Allan C. Eberhart ct al., Security
Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 45 J. FIN. 1457 (1990)
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To present tort claimants, by contrast, delay is especially damaging. They
typically have pressing medical and financial needs.7' In addition, they have
positive discount rates, preferring to have their money sooner rather than later.
Tort claimants are, therefore, in a difficult position. Equity holders, if they
choose, can delay bankruptcy proceedings by using a number of tactics.' - To
avoid delay, tort creditors must deal with equity holders in the reorganization
process. To gain their cooperation, a reorganization plan presumably must offer
rational equity holders a share in the firm that has a present value at least as
great as that of their call option on the assets of the firm. If equity protracts
the bankruptcy process too long, however, reorganization negotiations may fail,
and the debtor may be liquidated.
To induce equity holders to consent to a plan, present claimants can offer
to agree on a reorganization plan that divides the value of the firm between
present claimants and equity holders, but leaves little or nothing for future
claimants. This strategy can be illustrated with another stylized example. First,
equity holders, acting through the firm's management (the debtor-in-possession
in corporate reorganization73 ), could propose a reorganization plan based on
an overvaluation of the firm's assets," an undervaluation of tort liability, or
both. For the sake of simplicity, suppose the proposed plan overvalues the
debtor's $2 billion worth of assets at $3 billion and estimates the present value
of all tort claims, present and future, to be $3 billion. While under the absolute
priority rule all of the firm's value should be used to pay tort claims and none
should be used to pay equity holders, Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
allows creditors and equity holders to structure a reorganization plan that
deviates from the absolute priority rule.75 Thus present tort claimants can
forgo their absolute priority over equity holders in exchange for an agreement
by equity holders not to obstruct the bankruptcy process.
(supporting with empiricial evidence view that equity holders can use reorganization process strategically
to increase equity's value).
71. See. e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.. 129 BR. 710. 739-42 (Bankr. E. & S D.N Y
1991) (reviewing medical problems facing victims of asbestos exposure). vacated on other grounds. 982
F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), modified, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Ctr. 1993).
72. Equity's main agent for delaying reorganization is the debtor's management. See Adler. supra note
68, at 449. Management usually has incentives to serve equity's interests during reorganization. Id. at
449-50. Management can delay reorganization because it can exclude creditor plans during the first 180
days. Id. at 451; see II U.S.C. § 1121(b). (c) (1988). Management can also object to valuation and
distribution features of creditor plans and protract these objections through litigation. Adler. supra note 68.
at 451. Organized shareholders can also press their interests through litigation independently of
management.
73. See II U.S.C. § 1104(a) (providing for court appointment of trustee to manage debtor only after
request, notice, and hearing); ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, TilE LAw OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS 397 (1986) (noting that bankruptcy law embodies strong presumption that management will
remain in control of insolvent corporation in bankruptcy).
74. See Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization. 83 COLL,%I
L. REV. 527, 533-50 (1983).
75. See Adler, supra note 68, at 449-54.
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Equity holders and present claimants, for example, could agree on a plan
that placed only 80% of the equity of the reorganized entity in trust to satisfy
all tort claims and allocated to the old equity holders the remaining 20% of
equity in the reorganized entity. By valuing the debtor firm at $3 billion
instead of $2 billion, the plan creates the appearance of setting aside $2.4
billion (80% of $3 billion) for all tort claimants, while the actual value of the
stock placed in trust for tort claimants is only $1.6 billion (80% of the firm's
actual value, $2 billion). Equity holders in the debtor receive new stock in the
reorganized entity assessed by the plan to be worth $600 million (20% of the
firm's value under the plan, $3 billion), but actually worth $400 million (20%
of the firm's actual value, $2 billion). In terms of real value, equity holders
have managed to divert to themselves $400 million out of the $2 billion
available to pay all tort claims.
Present claimants can mitigate this loss for themselves. Some set of rules
must govern the distribution of the 80% of the value of the debtor firm to be
held in trust for tort claimants. The reorganization plan specifies these rules.
The plan can provide for either a "fast payout" or a "slow payout." The fast
payout would reflect liberal assumptions about how generously the trust could
compensate present claimants and still reserve sufficient funds for future
claimants. The slow payout would reflect conservative assumptions and would
reserve relatively more of the trust's assets for future claimants. Present
claimants could condition their forgoing of absolute priority on the plan's
adoption of fast rather than slow payout rules. Since equity holders would be
indifferent as to what payout rules the trust followed once their share of the
debtor's value was fixed, they would ultimately agree to this arrangement.76
They might, however, oppose fast payout rules strategically, holding
compensation to present claimants hostage until they and present claimants
reach some bargain as to what share in the reorganized entity the plan would
give to equity holders.
If the reorganization plan adopts fast payout rules for the trust, present
claimants will be able to claim, at the extreme, all of the trust funds, leaving
nothing for future claimants. In our example, operating under fast payout rules
the trust could use $1.6 billion (80% of the actual $2 billion value of the
debtor's assets) to discharge the $2 billion owed to present claimants, yielding
them a respectable pay-off ratio of 80 cents per dollar of claim. This is
significantly higher than the approximately 53 cents per dollar present
76. This assumes that if and when the trust runs out of money, former future claimants, who are now
present claimants. will not be able to modify the bankruptcy plan in a manner requiring equity holders to
make additional contributions. In the Manville case, claimants did ask for a modification of the plan. See
supra note 9. While there is some danger that if future claimants are sufficiently egregiously unprovided
for, they may be able to modify a final bankruptcy plan or even get legislative relief, these risks are
relatively remote compared to the opportunities for equity holders effectively to exclude future claimants
from compensation.
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claimants would receive if the trust treated claims of present and future
claimants equally and if the trust was funded with 80% of the value of the
debtor firm.77 It is also more than the approximately 67 cents per dollar of
claim that present claimants would receive if the plan funded the trust with all
of the value of the debtor firm, but allocated that value proportionately
between present and future claimants. 7 Therefore, present claimants are better
off entering into a strategic arrangement with equity holders in which present
claimants forgo absolute priority in favor of equity holders, but in turn garner
a disproportionately large share (100% in our example) of a smaller portion
(80% in our example) of the value of the debtor firm reserved for tort
claimants.7 9 Essentially, present claimants and equity holders can agree to
split among themselves the share that belongs to future claimants under the
equal-treatment norm. 0 All that stands in the way of this split is the future
claims representative, who is accountable not to the anonymous future
claimants, but to the court, an institution with incentives that incline it less to
fair allocation than to final agreement on a plan.
4. Strategic Behavior by Equity in the Manville Reorganization
The example above of strategic bargaining between equity and present
claimants is stylized for purposes of exposition. The Manville reorganization
is a more complex story, but it has a similar conclusion. "' Although
77. If the trust is funded with 80% of the S2 billion value of the hir. it uill contain about SI 6
billion. If present claimants receive their pro rata share fo their claims, the) %%ill receise about tuo-thirds
of this amount, or about S1.07 billion. Their cents per dollar of claim equals the amount the, recetc. SI 07
billion, divided by their total claims. S2 billion, for about 53 cents per dollar of claim
78. If the fund contains 100% of the firm value, it contains $2 billion If present claimants are treated
pro rata, they will receive two-thirds of this amount, or SI 33 billion, to Satisfy their S2 billion in
claims-about 67 cents per dollar of claim.
79. This illustration of a strategic arrangement bets een present claimants and equity holder- at the
expense of future claimants is a reasonably accurate depiction of the fundamental dnamic and result in
the reorganization of Manville, the largest mass tort bankruptcy reorganiztttion to date Under the Man% tile
Plan, equity holders in the old Johns-Manville Corporation receied approitiatel% 20t ot the equity
interest in the reorganized entity now known as the Manville Corporation. ulnle management retained
control of the reorganized corporation. For a sympathetic history of the negotiations leading to the
establishment of the Manville Trust. see Korobkin. supra note 52. at 755-61
80. Cf. Roe, supra note 74. Faced with the prospect of massixe tort habilitie,, corporate managers
might liquidate the corporation and pay the proceeds to present tort claimants. nontort creditor,, and equity
holders. This strategy would avoid liability for payment to future tort claimants, if one asuitc that the
"vanishing" of the corporation would effectively extinguish claims that did not matenalte sstthin the
statutorily prescribed period after liquidation dunng %shtch plamtiff may bnng claims against the
corporation under state corporate law. Roe has argued convincingly that succesor liability and fraudulent
conveyance laws effectively inhibit quick liquidation as a strategic response to bankruptcy The Mans tile
reorganization, however, demonstrates that another strategic a%enue for "dealing out" the future clattants
may be available. The Manville-style reorganization, like a quick liquidation. ditinbutes the salue of the
debtor firm to present claimants and equity holders and ma> effcctiscl% extingui,h uture claim, The
transaction costs of reorganization are much higher than those of a quick liquidation, of course, but if legal
constraints rule out quick liquidation as an attractive option to equity holders. Mans ile-st Ic reorganization
may be the next best alternative from the equity holders' stewpoint
81. See In re Johns-Manville Corp.. 66 B.R. 517 (Bankr S D N Y 1986)
The Yale Law Journal
negotiations among the debtor, creditors, and equity holders in the Manville
reorganization were strained from the beginning, relations between the Equity
Committee and the debtor (Manville management) worsened in the summer of
1984. At this time, equity holders began to realize that the debtor was
considering diluting equity's interest in order to finance payment of tort claims.
Equity holders had hoped to relegate present and future tort claimants to
seeking compensation solely from Manville's insurance proceeds and from
periodic contributions by the reorganized Manville business. In 1983, Manville
had unilaterally filed the so-called "M1-M2 Plan," which expressed these
hopes. This plan would have left equity holders' stake in the business intact.
Both creditors and codefendants adamantly rejected this plan; they proposed
in its stead a plan that used a trust vehicle and significantly diluted equity.
In August 1984, the court fatefully decided to appoint a legal
representative (LR) of future claimants. Before the appointment of the LR,
negotiations were multiparty and very slow and acrimonious. The LR adopted
the role of shuttle diplomat, selling his proposed plan to the various parties
separately. He apparently saw his role not as the intransigent defender of future
claimants, but as the honest broker among constituencies. That the LR adopted
the role of broker was not an accident, as the LR was the only claimant
representative whose constituency was entirely unable to monitor his
performance. In truth he was as he behaved, less a representative than a go-
between among representatives. The crucial element of the LR's proposal was
that between 50% and 80% of the stock of the reorganized Manville should be
given to the trust to finance the payment of tort claims. The LR subsequently
reached an agreement-in-principle with the debtor on the main heads of his
plan. One can glean a sense of the extent to which the LR was acting as a
broker among the present claimants and the equity holders, rather than as a
maximizer of the future claimants' interests, from the fact that the present
claimants harbored concerns that the LR was selling out present claimants to
the equity holders. No one ever expressed concern that the LR was
overreaching on behalf of his nominal clients, the future claimants. Present
claimants initially wanted the mass tort trust to be funded with no less than
100% of the new Manville stock. They also wanted the right to seek redress
from the successor company if trust funding proved inadequate.'
Notwithstanding these reservations, the present claimants eventually acquiesced
to the LR's proposed plan. Equity holders, however, fought it bitterly, filing
two lawsuits in Delaware court in hopes of obtaining judicial permission to
hold a shareholders' meeting to elect new directors of the debtor, who could
then repudiate the LR plan and propose one more favorable to equity. After the
82. Id. at 528.
83. Id. at 529.
84. Id. at 530.
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bankruptcy judge enjoined the shareholders from meeting," equity holders
accepted an 80% dilution of their interests, apparently preferring this result to
a liquidation of the company, which seemed at that point the only likely
alternative.
In simple terms, present claimants initially demanded 100% of Manville's
value, and more if necessary to pay existing claims. Equity holders insisted
that their interest be entirely preserved and that tort claimants be satisfied with
little more than insurance proceeds. Liberated from any concrete constituency,
the LR brokered a deal that gave tort claimants 80% of the firm's value, and
equity holders the remaining 20%. Present claimants objected not that the plan
awarded future claimants too much of the firm's value, but that the plan
inadequately funded the trust (a fear that later proved justified) even for
present claimants. The ultimate result, whatever the LR's intentions may have
been,86 was a division of the debtor's value between present claimants and
equity holders that left future claimants almost entirely unprovided for, as the
protections of future claimants in the plan proved completely ineffective. While
this story is more complicated than my stylized example, the results were the
same. Strategic behavior of present claimants and equity holders left future
claimants without remedy.
B. The Roe Proposal for Mass Tort Reorganization
Legal scholars have recognized that future tort claimants pose problems in
mass tort bankruptcies. In an important article that, among other things,
proposes a solution to the fair distribution problem, Professor Mark Roe argues
for pooling mass tort claims in a manner analogous to a variable annuity
fund,87 which would increase the ability of the trustees to adjust the amounts
they award to claimants in light of new information and circumstances."
Under Roe's proposal, the court would first place the value of the mass tort
firm in trust for tort claimants. Then, based on current estimates of the value
of the trust fund and the expected aggregate value of present and future claims,
trust administrators would issue shares against the trust fund to compensate tort
85. Id. at 542.
86. This interpretation of the Manville reorganization is not intended as a personal attack on the
integrity of the LR. Indeed, it may well be that but for the efforts and skill of the LR. the future claimants
would have been even worse off than they are. Before confirmation of the Plan. it may hasc scented that
the best hope for future claimants was to agree on some reorganization of Man% tile that kept the operating
company alive and produced income against which future claimants would hase some claim
87. Roe, supra note 62, at 866. 871-74. In a variable annuity contract, an insestor purchases "shares-
in a pool of assets, such as stock. The seller, often an insurance company, manages the pool and distributes
an equivalent number of shares or their cash value to the in% estor at a later time specified by the contract
When the contract matures, these shares will be worth more or less than their purchase price, depending
on whether the value of the underlying stock pool has risen or fallen For a description of variable
annuities, see Howard J. Saks. Variable Life Insurance Sales Increasing. V tnable Aninuirte Also Attractin
Attention, 14 EsT. PLAN. 374 (1987).
88. Roe, supra note 62, at 873-74,
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claimants. If the value of the trust fund declined, the trustees would adjust
downward the redemption value per share, reducing the cents per dollar of
claim paid to tort creditors. Similarly, if the trustees revised upward their
estimates of the aggregate value of future claims, they would issue and reserve
additional shares for future claimants and would pay out less when redeeming
shares. For example, if future claims were estimated to be $6 billion in present
value and the value of the trust's diversified stock pool was $2 billion, the
trustees would issue six billion shares to tort claimants as they came forward,
and would set the redemption value of each share at 33 cents. Thus, a claimant
with a claim of $1 million would receive one million shares in the trust pool,
which she could then redeem (for 33 cents per share) as necessary for medical
expenses or other purposes. If the value of the stock pool declined, the trustees
would adjust downward the redemption value per share. Consequently the
payout ratio (cents per dollar of claim actually paid) would also decline.
Similarly, if the trustees revised upward their estimates of the aggregate value
of future claims, they would issue and reserve additional shares for future
claimants and would pay out less when redeeming shares. If the trustees
revised their estimate of aggregate future claims from $6 billion to $8 billion,
for example, while the value of the stock pool remained constant at $2 billion,
the trustees would change the redemption value of each share from 33 cents
to 25 cents. The trustees presumably would review periodically their estimate
of the value of aggregate future claims and revise the trust's payout ratio
accordingly.89 In lieu of lump sums, Roe also suggests that the trust pay tort
claimants annuities that would vary as trustees revised their estimates of the
value of aggregate future tort claims.
While an improvement over the current system, the Roe proposal does not
remedy the main causes of the fair distribution problem. Under the Roe
proposal, the trustees estimate the expected value of future claims. The same
institutional, psychological, and strategic pressures that tend to make
bankruptcy courts and trust administrators undervalue future claims would also
affect the trustees in Roe's scheme. If, against all odds, the trustees determined
that future claimants must be adequately compensated, a danger arises that the
trustees would impose such draconian restrictions on payouts to present
claimants that they would be unfairly undercompensated.9" In either case,
89. While Roe does not address this possibility directly, I assume this would be the case since it makes
his proposal stronger.
90. It is important to note that even if trustees are not biased in favor of present claimants, they would
still be relatively ineffective processors of all the information relevant to determining the proper allocation
of available funds among present and future claimants. The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, for example,
was funded with $2.475 billion, the amount determined by the court to be sufficient to pay claimants. This
amount was the best estimate the court could make, but it was still merely a guess. The debtor A.H. Robins
argued that only $700 million was necessary to compensate plaintiffs. The Claimants' Cpmmittee argued
that S7 billion was necessary-a difference of one order of magnitude. An expert from the Aetna insurance
company estimated the Trust would need $2.2 billion. Vairo, supra note 41, at 628. The Trust adopted
payout procedures ostensibly designed to assure that adequate funds would be reserved for future claimants.
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administrators do not have the benefit of market mechanisms for estimating
total tort liability and making allocational decisions accordingly.
In the administration of a mass tort trust fund under the Roe proposal,
effective incentives to respond quickly to new information would not exist.
The trustees and their experts and staff would presumably be paid a
predetermined amount irrespective of how accurate their estimates of the value
of future claims turned out to be. Reputational effects would have some
influence on trust decisionmakers, but it is unclear which way these effects
would cut. Where information is costly, the conventional bureaucratic wisdom
of never confessing error and letting one's mistakes remain obscure might
prevail. In the mass tort context, this policy might embitter many future
claimants, but this would not directly affect the careers or other interests of the
trustees. In this regard, present claimants would probably have more influence
than future claimants.
Roe's proposal depends on administrative competence and discretion to
value future claims. Administrators are not likely to do this job well.
Shortcomings in the accuracy of administrative valuation have been well
documented. Judicial appraisal of corporate securities9 and valuation of real
estate for property tax purposes, "  for example, demonstrate that
administrative processes are poorly adapted to making what are essentially
pricing decisions. The Roe proposal is also not likely to benefit much from its
purported flexibility. Administrative processes respond slowly to new
information and often cope inadequately with existing information regarding
valuation decisions. Administrators also face incentives that can lead them to
make pricing decisions that are wrong even in light of the information they do
have. The elaborate models that administrators develop for economic planning
(of which the valuation of future tort claims is merely a specialized instance)
tend to acquire lives of their own. Experts often find it difficult to revise their
While it is impossible to know whether an administrative process is in fact rescrsing too much or too littlc
for these claimants-such is one of the main points of this Article--the Dalkon Shield process gies the
Trust great power to treat claimants arbitrarily. The Trust does not negotiate claims,, and of a claimant does
not accept the Trust's offer, she is immediately shunted into an arbitration procedure that s postponed until
all the claimants who do accept the Trust's offers are paid. The rule might be summarized as "take our
offer or go to the end of the line." This harsh rule may prevent bias in fasor of prescnt claimants of the
sort that occurred in the Manville bankruptcy. There is no reason to think. hocver. that by so doing it
treats either present or future claimants fairly in the sense of making the best use of avaiiable information
For a contrary perspective on the fairness of the Dalkon Shield process. see id
91. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Efficient Markets and Fair Values in Parent Subsidar% Mergers. 4 J
CORP. L. 63 (1978) (discussing shortcomings of judicial review of allocations of paricipation, in parent-
subsidiary mergers); Richard M. Buxbaum, The Dissenter's Appraisal Remedi. 23 UCLA L. Rtv 1229
(1976) (criticizing California's judicial appraisal procedures); Bayless Manning. The Shareholder's
Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker. 72 YALE LJ. 223 (1962) (criticizing court enforcement of
shareholder's appraisal remedies); W. Terrance Schreier & 0. Maurice Jo). Judicial Valuation of *Close'
Corporation Stock: Alice in Wonderland Revisited. 31 OKLA. L. RE '. 853 (1978) (discussing indctermTinacy
of judicial standards for appraising fair market value of corporate stock).
92. See Saul Levmore. Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law. 68 VA L. REV 771.
772-90 (1982).
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fundamental assumptions.93 Administrative processes are also vulnerable to
manipulation by interested parties. Just as federal and state administrative
agencies tend to be "captured" by the industries they regulate,94 so are present
claimants and equity holders likely to capture mass tort trusts, for the reasons
discussed above.95 Compared to future claimants, present claimants have
psychologically more vivid needs, are more zealously represented, have claims
that are either liquidated or methodologically more difficult to underestimate,
and are better positioned to enter into strategic alliances with equity holders
and with the management of the debtor firm.
III. A CAPITAL MARKETS APPROACH TO MASS TORT BANKRUPTCY
What institutional arrangements will solve the fair distribution problem?
In the last decade, especially in the areas of corporate law and bankruptcy,
legal scholars have become increasingly aware of the importance to their fields
of modem finance theory. Chief among the insights of finance theory is an
understanding that the capital markets possess powerful information-processing
capabilities.96 When a capital market prices an asset, it takes into account an
information set that, for all practical purposes, no one human mind is able to
process. In pricing the stock or debt of a large, actively traded company, the
market evaluates complex information about the firm's products, the products
of its competitors, consumer preferences, and macroeconomic trends-to name
but a few factors on a very long list. As a definitional matter, to value equity,
a residual claim, markets assess not only the present value of a firm's assets
but also the present value of its liabilities. Capital markets also estimate risks
of loss. In order to produce rational prices for a firm's securities, capital
markets must assess the possibility that a firm's value will be negatively
93. The Office of Management and Budget, for example, has used the same discount rate for 20 years.
The process of reviewing whether this discount rate should be changed has itself taken several years, See
Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, 57 Fed. Reg. 35,613 (1992)
(proposed Aug. 10, 1992).
94. Capture theory has been widely applied in administrative law, especially in the field of antitrust.
For an entertaining debate on the subject, see John S. Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism,
99 HARv. L. REV. 713, 724-26 (1986) (coining term "capture theory"); Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and
State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486 (1987) (criticizing Wiley's
capture theory); John S. Wiley, Jr., Reply, Revision and Apology in Antitrust Federalism, 96 YALE L.J.
1277 (1987); Merrick B. Garland, Reply, Antitrust and Federalism: A Response to Professor Wiley, 96
YALE L.J. 1291 (1987).
95. See supra part II.A.3.
96. For an account of information-processing mechanisms in the capital markets, see Ronald Gilson
& Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984). A classic if
somewhat dated account may be found in Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory
and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); see also Myron S. Scholes, The Market for Securities:
Substitution Versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45 J. Bus. 179 (1972)
(suggesting that information effects are more important than price pressure in moving prices toward
efficient levels in security markets).
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affected by labor troubles, litigation, war, rumors, bad weather, loss of key
personnel, bad management, and any other element relevant to firm health. '
The contingent facts that bear upon the valuation of future claims in a
mass tort bankruptcy are no more or less complex than those involved in
pricing the securities of a large, publicly traded company. The quantity and
complexity of the information that must be taken into account in valuing the
securities of a large concern worth billions of dollars are similar to the quantity
and complexity of the information that must be taken into account in valuing
tort claims worth billions of dollars. This similarity strongly suggests that the
capital market is the best institutional mechanism for valuing mass tort claims
in a manner that takes account of all pertinent information in a timely and
accurate manner.
Capital markets can be used to provide a fair distribution between present
and future claimants in a mass tort bankruptcy. I explain below how a
bankruptcy court could use a capital markets approach to structure a mass tort
settlement trust and solve the fair distribution problem. I also show that this
solution is consistent with the equal-treatment norm of bankruptcy described
above.
A. Solving the Fair Distribution Problem: Structuring the Trust and
Compensation
I can best explain the capital markets approach by returning to the example
above that illustrated the fair distribution problem. Recall the firm, possessing
a value of $2 billion absent tort claims, that tortiously releases a toxin into the
environment and causes an unknown amount of harm. Assume for now that
this harm is greater than $2 billion, that the company is insolvent and has
entered bankruptcy, and that the firm has no contract creditors. Suppose also
that the best available research estimates that the injuries caused by the tort
will manifest themselves over twenty-five years. How can a bankruptcy court
structure the mass tort bankruptcy so that present and future claimants are
treated impartially in the sense that neither subset of tort creditors is
undercompensated or overcompensated?
Assuming that the insolvency of the mass tort firm is clear and that there
are no contract creditors, 98 the first step under the capital markets approach
is for the bankruptcy court to place the entire value of the firm in trust for the
97. See, e.g., GILSON & BLACK. supra note 47. at 219-21
98. If there are contract creditors, mass tort bankruptcy law should treat them as having the same
priority as tort creditors or a lower priority than tort creditors. If the law accords them the ,,ame pnonty.
they should receive trust shares just like those of tort creditors. If the law accords them lower priority, they
should receive trust shares in junior tranches. See mifra part IV.A. Treating contract creditors as superior
to tort creditors might create problems of temporal justice (in addition to fairness problems already noted
by bankruptcy scholars, see infra note 174). See generally infra part IV.B.
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tort claimants. The trust will use this trust fund, pursuant to the bankruptcy
plan, to compensate both present and future tort creditors. Risk-averse
prospective tort claimants would choose to have the trust make low-risk
investments in order to reduce the variance of the value of their claims.
Because prospective tort creditors would realize that their claims might
manifest themselves many years after the mass tort bankruptcy, they would
also insist that the trust fund be hedged against inflation.
The next step under the capital markets approach is formulating the payout
terms for compensating tort claimants. Determining how the court should
formulate these terms is the key to solving the fair distribution problem. Under
the capital markets approach, the court would structure the trust as a
liquidating trust with a definite term at least as long as, and preferably
somewhat longer than, the best available estimate of the time period over
which all or virtually all of the injuries caused by the tort would fully manifest
themselves. In our example, the mass tort causes injuries that experts think will
manifest themselves fully in no more than twenty-five years. The bankruptcy
plan therefore would set the life of the trust at perhaps thirty years to allow for
a five-year margin of error. After thirty years, the trustees would liquidate the
trust and distribute its value pro rata to all holders of trust shares, much as the
value of an all-equity corporation with no debts is distributed upon dissolution
pro rata to its common shareholders.
Under the capital markets approach, the trust would compensate tort
claimants with liquidated claims by issuing them shares in the trust fund.
Courts and commentators have exerted great effort to devise alternatives to the
traditional, costly, individualized proceedings for liquidating tort claims in the
mass tort context.99 The capital markets approach, however, need not address
the preferences of prospective tort creditors regarding procedures for
99. This literature suggests that streamlined judicial and administrative processes might lower
transaction costs. See Francis E. McGovern, Management of Multiparty Toxic Tort Litigation: Case Law
and Trends Affecting Case Management, 19 FORUM I (1983) (study of toxic substances litigation drawing
general lessons for complex case management); Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort
Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659 (1989) (case study approach concluding that procedural innovations for
mass tort litigation are worthwhile); Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing
Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440 (1986) (case study approach drawing general lessons for
complex case management); see also Symposium, Claims Resolution Facilities and the Mass Settlement
of Mass Torts, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1990, at I (symposium issue on mass tort claims
resolution facilities). Prospective tort creditors in the hypothetical contract setting would prefer a liquidation
process that, other things being equal, had lower transaction costs. Reducing transaction costs increases the
expected return on tort claims because it makes more of the debtor's value available to pay claims. Other
things, however, will not necessarily be equal. For instance, inexpensive and inaccurate claims liquidation
methods may increase the variance of the return on claims. Risk-averse claimants would prefer to avoid
this variance. Prospective tort creditors would thus have to consider what trade-off between risk and
expected returns they prefer. Preferences regarding this trade-off are familiar in finance theory under the
rubric of the asset pricing models, the most familiar of which is the capital assets pricing model (CAPM).
The CAPM conventionally models this trade-off by an indifference function that relates various
combinations of risk and return in a capital assets portfolio. See, e.g., JAMES C. VAN HORNE. FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 60-65 (7th ed. 1986). Asset pricing models that incorporate factors in addition
to systematic risk (beta) are probably more realistic. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 47, at 129-32.
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liquidating claims. The fair distribution problem arises only after claims have
been liquidated by some process. The problem is deciding to what extent
various claimants should have their claims satisfied. It is an open question
whether jury trials, settlements, administrative processes, or other mechanisms
most fairly value tort claims. I assume here that tort claimants already have
their claims liquidated by some process, so they are able to present to the trust
a judgment for a certain dollar amount. The capital markets approach is
preferable to administrative allocation, so long as the method used to liquidate
claims is independent of the trust administration. Otherwise, arbitrary matters
that distort the current system, such as whether the trust administrators feared
that the trust would run out of money before compensating all the claimants,
would contaminate the estimate of how much harm a particular claimant
suffered.
The next step under the capital markets approach is the actual
compensation of claims. The trust would distribute trust shares to tort
claimants so that the face amount of the shares it issued to a given claimant
equaled the liquidated value of that person's claim. For example, the trust
would issue 50,000 shares in the trust fund to a tort claimant with a proven
claim for $50,000. It is important to note, for reasons explained later, that
these shares, like common stock."t° would be subject to dilution by the
subsequent issuance of additional shares. The trust shares would bear interest
in the sense that they would entitle the bearer to claim from the trust the face
amount of the trust share, plus the interest that had accumulated on that
amount in the time between its issuance and the liquidation of the trust. In the
event that the trust did not have enough funds to pay all claims fully, claimants
would be paid pro rata. Since the mass tort firm is insolvent, we can assume
that pro rata payment will be the norm.
The function of the trustees under the capital markets approach would be
ministerial. They would not be empowered to issue shares on their own
initiative. Instead, their mandate would be mechanical: Upon presentation of
proof of a valid jury verdict, settlement, or other determination of damages in
a given amount, the trust would issue the claimant shares with a face value of
that amount. The trust would not itself estimate or liquidate the damages of
individual claimants or make any estimates regarding expected future claims.
The trust would not decide how to allocate its funds among present and future
claimants. Hence the factors that tend to make current trusts skew distribution
toward present claimants would be neutralized: even if the trust were inclined
to favor present claimants, it would be unable to effect its favoritism."'
Who, then, would make the distributional decision that is the subject of this
100. Common stock is normally subject to dilution bs the subsequent issuance of additional shares,
but it is often protected by preemptive rights or other antidilution provisions
101. If the trust were biased toward future or random claimants, the capital markets approach whould
still have its corrective effect.
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Article? Under the capital markets approach, the capital markets would "make"
this decision. '0 2
B. The Pricing of Trust Shares and the Fair Distribution Problem
The heart of the capital markets approach is its making the mass tort
shares issued by the trust tradeable on capital markets. Because the shares
would be subject to dilution by the issuance of additional shares, their market
price would express the best estimate of the capital markets as to the number,
size, and interest terms of the trust shares that would be issued during the life
of the trust.
We can demonstrate the pricing of trust shares with an example that leaves
aside for the moment the effect of interest rates and discounting, and
concentrates exclusively on the magnitude of total injury claims.'0 3 Suppose
a mass tort firm is insolvent because the firm has committed a tort that will
cause more in damages than the firm's value of $2 billion. No one person or
party knows for certain the upper bound of the tort damages. Let us suppose
that before reorganization plaintiffs' lawyers had argued that the damages
would be at least $20 billion, while the debtor firm's managers and equity
holders argued that the damages would come in at under $1 billion. Because
the court is using the capital markets approach, it does not have to make an
impossible, Solomonic estimate of where in the vast gulf between these two
estimates the truth lies. The court need only determine that the firm's tort
liabilities are sufficiently greater than the value of the firm so that, assuming
there are no other liabilities, all of the value of the firm should be devoted to
satisfying tort claims."" The court will then establish a mass tort trust fund
102. Some lawyers involved in the Manville bankruptcy suggested securitizing claims to the Trust as
a substitute for making cash payments to present claimants during the period prior to 1997. This plan
countenanced a 1997 administrative determination of future liabilities. See Transcript of Proceedings, Jan.
23, 1991, at 169-74, In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710 (Bankr. E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(No. 90-3973). The plan's apparent purpose was to relieve the Trust of the burden of raising cash to make
payments to claimants who needed cash immediately. The designers of the plan provided for an
administrative process to estimate the magnitude of future liability; they apparently did not imagine that
the market could make this determination. Id. at 174. Interestingly, investment bankers estimated that they
would charge $5 million in fees for securitizing claims on the value of the Trust. Id. at 173.
103. Because we are ignoring discounting effects and the interest rate feature of the trust shares, in
this example it is as though the life of the trust were zero. That is, the trust is funded, shares arc distributed,
prices are determined by the market, and the trust is liquidated, all simultaneously. This unrealistic
assumption is relaxed later in this Section.
104. 1 concede that the current structure of bankruptcy law makes the elimination of equity difficult,
even though such elimination is completely justified by the lowest priority of equity's claim on the debtor's
assets. This flaw in current bankruptcy law has been commented on extensively in the literature. See supra
note 40. The lack of a rational structure for dealing with the uncertain magnitude of future tort claims
exacerbates this bias toward equity holders in the present system. As a practical matter, implementation of
the capital markets approach might require Congress to reformulate the role of equity in corporate
reorganization, at least in the context of mass tort bankruptcies.
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and, after the reorganization or liquidation, will fund the trust with $2 billion
in risk-free assets.
Next, capital market participants who are independent of the bankruptcy
process estimate what the total magnitude of liability will be. They are in the
business for profit, and if their estimates are poor, they will lose money."
These outside participants have every incentive to follow the industry, the
particular case, and the relevant science to make their estimates as accurate as
possible. Suppose the capital market expects" that the tort will ultimately
cause $5 billion in damages and that therefore five billion trust shares will be
outstanding at the end of the life of the trust. Leaving aside the fact that trust
shares will have an interest term to account for the risk associated with time,
and assuming a zero discount rate, each share would have a current market
price of about 40 cents ($2 billion, the value of the trust, divided by five
billion, the number of shares). A block of 50,000 shares should have a market
value of about $20,000. When trust shares trade for a price of 40 cents per
share, the capital market is implicitly estimating that the trust's assets of S2
billion will be divided among claimants or their transferees who have suffered
$5 billion in liquidated damages from the mass tort.
Because the time periods involved in mass tort bankruptcy trusts are
significant, a capital markets approach must consider the time value of money.
In order to treat claimants fairly-in the sense of treating them according to
a rule to which they would subscribe in the hypothetical contract setting-the
proposed trust shares must include an interest term. This interest term can be
best explained by a numerical example. Suppose a corporation tortiously
releases a strange new toxin into the environment that immediately causes $1
105. Cf Korobkin, supra note 52. at 755-61 (describing complex struggle between vanous interests
in bankruptcy process of Johns-Manville). Korobkm characterizes the ManstIle reorganization in the
following way:
The Manville reorganization illustrates the failings of the economic account In %%hat
sense is a corporation in bankruptcy, such as Manville. "a pool of assets"" A pool of assets is
a dead object. According to an economic view. it can change only if it changes in value But
Manville, although in bankruptcy, is much more than its assets. Manville is an enterpnse ith
a history, as well as an indeterminate future. Participants in Manville's financial distress have
strong feelings about what Manville has done and might do. Manville in bankruptcy is a moral.
political, and social agent. It is capable of changing its personality and, as it does so. it affects
the lives of participants in its financial distress.
Id. at 761 (footnote omitted). It is true that people, especially lawyers, get consumed by complex mass tort
litigation, including bankruptcies, and may begin to view the corporations involed as having personalities
and moral qualities such as guilt, repentance, and. after passing through the purgatory of reorganization.
redemption. I know this from having worked as a lawyer at a law firm involked in mass tort bankruptcies.
These feelings are irrational. Irrational feelings distort judgments about such objective matters as how many
people actually will get sick and how sick will they get in the next 30 years. It is an advantage of the
capital markets approach that it disregards the emotional background of bankruptcy cases and employs the
rational and objective judgments of persons competing in the capital market.
106. When saying the capital market "'expects" or "'estimates." I am speaking, of course,
metaphorically. I do not mean that the capital market is like a person %ho has expectations. In fact. only
market participants have expectations and make estimates. and market mechanisms diseipline these
expectations and estimates. Cf Gilson & Kraakman. supra note 96 (deseribing hos, interaction between
capital-market mechanisms and the information market influences market effictienci)
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billion in damages and is certain to cause at least as much harm within the
next ten years, in another single, sudden outbreak of disease. The mass tort
firm is worth only $2 billion; pursuant to a reorganization, $2 billion is placed
in trust for present and future tort claimants. Present claimants make claims for
$1 billion in the first year of the trust, and the trust issues them trust shares
with a face value of $1 billion. In the tenth and last year of the trust, just
before its liquidation, another $4 billion in damages suddenly manifests itself.
We now have two groups of victims that have suffered different amounts of
harm at different times. If there were no interest term, the trust shares of the
present claimants would entitle them as a class to $1 billion/N of the total
liquidation value of the trust, where N represents the total face value of all
shares issued by the trust prior to its liquidation.
This approach would be unfair, however, in the sense that prospective
mass tort bankruptcy claimants would not agree to it in the hypothetical
contract setting. Without an interest term, the present claimants would receive
a claim for 20% of the liquidation value of the trust.' °7 Invested at a risk-free
rate of, say, 5%, however, the liquidation value of the trust in year ten would
be $3.26 billion.08 If market participants anticipate correctly that the mass
tort will produce another $4 billion in injuries in year ten, then they will offer
at most the present value of 20% of $3.26 billion, or approximately $400
million,'09 for the trust shares of present claimants; consequently, present
claimants will receive about 40 cents per dollar on their claims when they sell
their trust shares."0 Without an interest term, however, future claimants
would get 80%" of the value of the trust upon termination, or $2.61 billion.
Selling (or cashing in) their claims for this amount will yield them about 65
cents per dollar of their claims'32-more than one and a half times what
present claimants receive. Risk-averse prospective claimants would not agree
107. The earlier claimants would receive trust shares with a face value of $1 billion, which without
an interest term would be divided by the total claims outstanding at the termination of the trust, or $5
billion; $1 billion divided by $5 billion would give them 20% of the liquidation value of the trust.
108. The formula for determining the terminal value (TV) of an amount of money is
7V= Xo (I +r)"
where TV is the terminal value, X0 is the original amount of money, r is the interest rate received on that
amount, and n is the number of years over which the interest is paid. This formula assumes that
compounding occurs once a year. See VAN HORNE, supra note 99, at 13-18.
109. Twenty percent of $3.26 billion is $652 million. The present value of $652 million, using a
discount rate of 5% and a period of 10 years, is approximately $400 million. The formula for determining
the present value (PV) of an amount of money received in the future is
PV = TV/ (I + r)'
where PV is the present value, TV is the terminal value of the money, r is the interest rate, and n is the
number of years between the present year and the terminal year. This formula also assumes that
compounding occurs once a year.
110. Note that present claimants receive 20% of their total claims when they sell their trust shares.
The rate of return on the invested trust money (5%) and the discount rate (5%) are a wash.
I 1l. This percentage is calculated by taking $4 billion (late claimants' total claims) and dividing it
by $5 billion (the total of all claims).
112. To calculate cents per dollar of claim, take the amount received ($2.61 billion) and divide it by
the total amount of claims ($4 billion), yielding a quotient of .652-about 65 cents per dollar of claim.
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to this disparate treatment any more than they would agree to a scheme that
favored present over future claimants.
To remedy this problem, the shares that the trust distributes must bear
interest. Since the trust funds will be invested in risk-free securities, the trust
shares should bear the risk-free interest rate. At a risk-free rate of 5%, the
nominal terminal value of the present claimants' $1 billion face-value trust
shares will be $1.63 billion in year ten. The future claimants who appear in
year ten with their claim for $4 billion receive no interest since their claim
coincides with the termination of the trust. By distributing the S3.26 billion
termination value of the trust to early and late claimants on a pro rata basis,
each class will receive the same payout ratio."' Claimants receive the same
payment per dollar of claim regardless of whether they were early or late. This
is the equal treatment that risk-averse prospective tort claimants would choose
in the hypothetical contract setting."4
C. A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy at Work
The market for trust shares would resemble in many respects the market
for stock and debt in publicly traded companies. The markets for these capital
assets take account of information much more efficiently than could any
administrative process. Prices of trust shares would change rapidly to reflect
new information that bears on the value of future tort claims.
1. Marketable Trust Shares and New Infornation
Consider the response speeds of a liquid capital market and an
administrative process to new epidemiological information relevant to the value
of future claims. Imagine that a scientist discovers evidence suggesting that the
113. Given that future claimants are entitled to $4 billion and that present claimants are entitled to
$1.63 billion, the trust will not contain enough funds at termination (only S3.26 billion) to satisfy all claims
fully. Holders of present claimants' shares will get a pro rata share of the trust's value equal to the
percentage their claims constitute of the total of all claims. Present claimants have claims of $1 63 billion.
and future claimants have claims of $4 billion, so total claims are S5.63 billion. Present claims constitute
29% of $5.63 billion. Thus holders of present claimants' trust shares should receive 29% of the trust's
terminal value of $3.26 billion, or approximately $940 million. The remaining $2.32 billion (71% of the
trust fund) should go to holders of the trust shares of the future claimants. Their trust shares thus entitle
them to receive $2.32 billion in satisfaction of their claim of $4 billion, or 57.9 cents per dollar of claim
Holders of present claimants' trust shares receive, as I note above. S940 million for their sharms Recall.
however, that this is what holders receive in year 10, when the trust is liquidated The question is. hoA
much will present claimants receive in year I when they sell their trust shares into the capital market" The
present claimants will be able to sell their entitlement to receive $940 million out of a risk-free asset pool
10 years from now for that amount, discounted at the 10-year risk-free rate of 5%. or $579 million This
amount is 57.9% of the present claimants' SI billion claim. Thus present claimants, like future claimants.
will receive about 58 cents on each dollar of their respective claims.
114. Fairness between present and future claimants also requires that the principal and accumulated
interest of trust shares receive equal priority in the liquidating distribution of the trust, This prioritizing
would make it less likely that separate markets would develop for trust-share coupons and strips. except
perhaps as a way of converting large shares into more tradeable denominations
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damage caused by a toxic tort will be significantly greater than had been
previously thought. Under the capital markets approach, prices would adjust
quickly to this new information. Price adjustments would also reflect the
probability of truth that the market attributed to the discovery." 5 Indeed, the
efficient capital markets hypothesis (ECMH) suggests that price adjustments
take place so quickly that traders cannot profit systematically from trading on
new information after it becomes public. 116 Efficient capital markets operate
in sharp contrast to likely scenarios of administrative price setting." 7
115. GILSON & BLACK, supra note 47, at 220 (providing illustrative hypothetical about market impact
of conflicting information relating to same event).
116. See JAMES H. LORIE Er AL., THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 65-73 (2d ed. 1985)
(concluding that literature supports semistrong form of efficient capital markets hypothesis). For empirical
support for ECMH, see Eugene F. Fama et al., The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10
INT'L ECON. REV. I (1969); Michael C. Jensen, Problems in Selection of Security Portfolios: The
Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964, 23,J. FIN. 389 (1968). For a more recent review
of ECMH evidence, see Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: I, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1582-86 (1991).
117. Manville provides a good illustration. The following is an excerpt of an order quashing a notice
of deposition from a plaintiffs' lawyer who sought disclosure of the methods being used to value future
claims. It illustrates exceptionally well the pace and style of administrative valuation of future claims:
At a fairness hearing Professor Berger suggested a court-sponsored independent study to
predict the flow of future claims. She recommended the appointment of [several medical and
epidemiological experts from prestigious medical schools] as neutral, independent experts....
On April 22, 1991, the courts approved Professor Berger's proposals.
After extensive computer and other studies and discussion with consultants, the courts,
interested counsel and the Trust, on August II, 1993 [more than two years later] the 706 Panel
issued a draft report (the "Report"). The 70 page draft was supported by hundreds of additional
pages of calculations, charts, graphs and tables projecting claims to the year 2049. It was filed
and docketed and widely distributed.
On August 12, 1993 the courts issued a memorandum and order setting out the method
of informal discovery that would be used in an initial evaluation of the Rule 706 Report. "All
parties are entitled to be notified of the court's intention to utilize [the Report] and must be
provided with some opportunity to review the expert's qualifications and work in advance."
A hearing was set designed to permit all parties to participate in evaluation of the Report.
It is described in the order as follows: "The authors of the Rule 706 report will be asked to
present their report in the form of sworn testimony. They may be cross-examined. The parties
may present their own testimony and exhibits relevant to the question of estimating numbers
and volume of future asbestos claims."
Thereafter, under the direction of the courts, the Report was made available to all parties
so they could study and evaluate it. Further data was provided by the Trust. At informal
meetings among parties, Panel members and experts for the Trust, details of methodology and
suggestions for improvements were thoroughly evaluated. The courts did not attend these
sessions.
A hearing on the Report was scheduled for September 28, 1993. On motion of the Trust
and all class and sub-class counsel, the hearing was adjourned to allow more time to analyze
the results.
The authors of the Report requested time to provide additional information in response
to comments on thefirst draft. Thereafter, the Panel issued a supplemental draft supported by
graphs responding to issues raised by the parties. It was 79 pages in length. Still more meetings
were held with counsel to the parties at which the Panel answered questions. The Panel remains
open to comments on its Report and continues to undertake further analyses suggested by the
parties.
A draft report of the experts retained by the Trust was circulated by the Trust to all
interested parties. It provided further opportunity for criticism and analyses of the Panel's drafts.
In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 151 F.R.D. 540, 542-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added). The process described above is not one that can respond quickly to new information.
In spite of its length and complexity, there is no reason to think that this process will produce valuations
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Trustees would presumably consult their own experts for an opinion on the
validity of the scientific discovery of an outside expert. "S How long would
this evaluation take? A week? A month? A year? Readers familiar with the
frequent delays involved in federal environmental law processes,"' for
example, or in the approval of new drugs by the Food and Drug
Administration -1 2 ' realize that even estimates of many months may be
optimistic. Moreover, administrative agencies typically take pains to ensure the
public's continued confidence in their expertise. The trustees of a mass tort
trust would be unlikely to reduce their payout on the basis of a report that they
regarded as only probably true. They would more likely direct their own
experts to study new reports until they could confidently judge them to be
correct or incorrect. This process would almost certainly entail long delays.
2. Capital Markets and Biased Price Determination
In addition to the problems of delay noted above, the judgment of trust
administrators concerning new information would not be impartial. New
information might suggest not only that harm would be greater than previously
expected, but also that the trust experts should have been aware of this
information before initially valuing claims. New information that reflected
badly on the past judgments of trust administrators would be incorporated
especially slowly-or not at all-in payout rates. Price adjustment in efficient
or even somewhat efficient capital markets is much less subject to these
problems. Indeed, tests of price movements in capital markets indicate that
prices have little or no "inertia," suggesting there is little or no commitment
to past mistakes and no hesitation by market participants to reevaluate assets
on the basis of new information.'
2'
on which investors would be willing to risk capital.
Another way of conceptualizing the trade-off between market and administratise processes is to think
in terms of differing strategies for dealing with complexity See generally Peter It Schuck. Legal
Complexity: Some Causes. Consequences. and Cures. 42 DUKE LJ. I. 1-18 (1992) (describing and
evaluating legal complexity).
118. Administrators prefer to be autonomous, not subject to the res ies, of outside authorities To foster
autonomy, administrators rely on their own experts. Cf JAMES Q. WItSON . BUREALCRACY WHAT
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY Do IT 244-48 (1989) (arguing that technical tasks make
federal agencies more independent of Congress).
119. A depiction of delay in the federal environmental law context can be found in Daniel Ackman.
Highway to Nowhere: NEPA. Environmental Review and the \Vestway Case. 21 COLUt.t J L & SOc
PROBs. 325, 330-32 (1988).
120. The long delays involved in the approval of new drugs hae recently become controversial as
terminally ill patients have become more vocal in demanding the right to seek experimental treatment. For
the (arguable) benefit of future consumers, federal regulation imposes heasy costs on rersons with much
shorter time horizons. For the regulatory and political background of this issue. see generally Barry S.
Roberts & Sara M. Biggers, Regulatory Update: The FDA Speeds up Hope for the Desperately Ill and
Dying, 27 AM. BUS. L.J. 403 (1989); Lisa C. Will. Note. Accelerated FDA Approval of Investigational New
Drugs: Hope for Seriously Ill Patients, 94 DICK. L. REV. 1037 (1990)
121. If market participants were reluctant to react to new information, stock prices would presumably
show signs of autocorrelation--that is. one could predict future prices in pan just by looking at past price
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In addition, administrators' judgment can sometimes be influenced by
politics. Scientific debates over nuclear power, global warming, and destruction
of tropical rainforests seem to be affected by the participants' attitudes toward
such charged issues as the moral status of market-based economies, the
desirability of technological progress, and the relationship between rich and
poor countries. The trustees of a large mass tort trust, to the extent they
exercised discretionary powers, could easily become enmeshed in political
controversy. Just as politics has played a role in the making of regulatory
decisions in the environmental arena,122 political considerations might
influence administrative estimates of the magnitude of future claims. Market
pricing of trust shares would be less subject to political influences than would
an administrative process. Traders in trust shares who let their politics cloud
their view of the real facts concerning the magnitude of damages, for example,
would be penalized by traders with cooler heads. Trustees in an administrative
process who bent with the prevailing political winds, by contrast, could hope
to receive the various rewards, such as appointment to more desirable offices,
that politics can offer to its skillful players.
Market institutions, of course, are not perfectly rational. Capital markets,
however, do create powerful incentives to take account of existing information
and to respond quickly to new information. Nor in a market system is there
any requirement that all market participants follow the same model in
determining whether to buy shares (because they think the shares are
underpriced) or sell them (because they think the shares are overpriced).
Capital markets permit different estimating methodologies to compete against
one another, and allow those who subscribe to a given method to risk their
own money on its accuracy. Trust administrators would not have such
flexibility.
3. Capital Markets and the Cost of Rent Seeking
Under the capital markets approach, the trust share pricing process would
be decentralized; in an administrative process, it would be centralized.
information. Evidence of autocorrelation, however, is weak in spite of exhaustive study. Economists have
searched for autocorrelation in seeking to confirm the hypotheses that markets overreact to new information
or follow fads. Critics of ECMH have argued that the market may behave this way. See Lawrence ff.
Summers, Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591 (1986)
(presenting evidence indicating irrational stock market reactions to information). Empirical studies, however,
suggest that such irrationalities are not prevalent. See Eugene . Fama & Kenneth R. French, Permanent
and Temporary Components of Stock Market Prices, 96 J. POL. ECON. 246 (1988) (finding only weak
evidence of autocorrelation).
122. The classic account is BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR
(1981). For a recent, detailed, and impressive account of the regulatory process in the electric power
industry, including political distortions of that process, see Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The




Decentralized processes are more costly for interested parties to manipulate.
Compare, for example, how the current reorganization negotiation process and
the capital markets approach would determine the payout rules for a mass tort
trust. In reorganization, equity holders and present claimants have
representatives who negotiate face to face and can agree on structures that will
price present claims too high and future claims too low. Alternatively, if
independent trustees make valuation decisions, present claimants have one
locus of decisionmaking authority to which they can make their humanitarian
and political appeals. Rent seeking in the current bankruptcy process involves
little risk and promises large gains. If present claimants collude to drive up the
price of trust shares, individual claimants would tend to defect from the cartel,
underbid the cartel, and cause a competitive market price to reemerge.'2'
Market processes, on the other hand, are not so readily "gamed." While traders
sometimes attempt to manipulate markets, these strategies tend to fail and
usually risk large losses.
4. The Liquidation Process and Rational Expectations
Because the liquidation process is independent of trust administration, the
capital markets approach would also tend to defeat bias in favor of present (or
other) claimants in the liquidation process. Suppose, for example, that
liquidators (whether jurors or administrators) decide that present claimants
deserve to be fully compensated notwithstanding the negative distributional
effect this will have on future claimants. The liquidators decide to award the
present claimants twice the amount of damages that they have suffered,
intending that the present claimants receive about full compensation once their
shares are discounted under the capital markets approach. The capital markets,
however, will embody rational expectations about the liquidation process.'"
If the liquidation process inflates claims, then the market will expect future
liquidations to be inflated as well, and so will discount accordingly the shares
traded by present claimants. Therefore, efforts by liquidators to favor present
claimants by inflating estimates of their damages will tend to be self-defeating.
The market acts as a check on the psychological, political, and other influences
that tend to distort the liquidation process away from a fair distribution.
123. An attempt to manipulate trust share prices %%ould encounter problems similar to thosc of
attempting to enforce a cartel. See GEORGE J. STIGLER. A il'heor, of Ohgoll . in Tilt ORGN%,i- 'no, oi
INDUSTRY 39 (1968).
124. Rational expectations theory is perhaps most familiar in monctarN cconomic, Thi, theorN hold,
that the monetary authority cannot affect real economic acutist in the long term becaus. hou,,eholds and
firms have rational expectations about the inflationary effects of expansts monetar poli:c. and so sill
not change their real economic activity in response to it. See generalls Tiio% A J SARGL-i . RATIONAL
EXPECTATIONS AND INFLATION (1986); J.J. SIBE.N. RATIONAL ExPEcTATiON s .A'D MONETrRY POLICY
(1980); Eduard J. Bomhoff, Inflation. rte Quantity Theory. and Rational Elpecrtatins. in 5 SItDIES i%
MONETARY ECONOMICS 11-14 (Karl Brunner ed.. 1980).
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5. The Market for Trust Shares
Because the trust shares would be rather exotic securities, trading in trust
shares would probably be limited to institutions. Successful trading would
require a sophisticated understanding of market dynamics and the scientific and
other factors influencing the mass tort. Rival market institutions would likely
employ their own analysts with specialized expertise and their own networks
of contacts in the relevant scientific and other fields. In contrast to an
administrative approach that compensates administrators without regard to the
accuracy of their estimates, the capital markets approach would reward these
analysts, traders, and financial institutions for successfully estimating the size
of future claims.
While trust shares would be somewhat exotic, they would be no more
exotic than some securities that are already traded. Compared to various
derivative instruments, for example, trust shares would not be unusually
complex. Derivatives may be divided into two basic categories: options and
futures."t An option is the right to buy or sell an underlying asset at or
before a certain time for a certain price. A future or "forward-based contract"
is a contract in which a party buys an asset at a given price from another party
now, with delivery and payment to be made at some future date. Forward-
based contracts, in essence, "freeze" the price of the asset for the buyer and
seller.'26
Trust shares would more closely resemble forward-based contracts than
options. Imagine an investor who buys a forward-based contract for cotton
with a price of $10 a bushel and a delivery date of ten months from the
present. Of course, determining the rational price to pay for such a contract is
complex. Among the factors that the buyer and seller must consider is the
likelihood of good weather. The more cotton grown, the less, other things
being equal, the forward contract will be worth-an increase in supply will
bring the price of cotton down and decrease the margin between the price
agreed upon in the forward contract and the actual price. Trust share pricing
would be somewhat analogous. Investors would seek to estimate as best they
could the "crop" of injuries that a given mass tort would produce. Since the
trust share is a pro rata claim on an underlying pool of assets, the fewer the
number of future claimants and the less severe their injuries, the more each
trust share would be worth.
While sophisticated investors would employ complicated models to price
trust shares, the trust shares, as an investment product, are easier to understand
125. See Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the
Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1464-67 (1993) (describing basic features of
options and futures).
126. STAFF OF THE N.Y. INST. OF FIN., STOCK, BONDS, OPTIONS, FUTURES: INVESTMENTS AND TlUIR
MARKETS 175-89 (Stuart R. Veale ed., 1987).
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and might be easier to price than many of the bewilderingly complex
instruments now traded in huge volumes on the international capital
market. 127 The over-the-counter market in derivatives is large and deep;
major financial institutions and their sophisticated clients trade volumes of very
complicated instruments on the market every day. -'2 8 Individual claimants
would lack the sophistication necessary to trade in the trust share market, but
they could trade through intermediaries. So long as the underlying asset pool
was large enough, intermediaries would be interested in pooling trust shares
and selling them in blocks of a size sufficient to interest large institutions.
Alternatively, it is possible that trust shares, which would have standardized
terms, could be listed on a public securities market and traded like equity
securities. Whether trust shares would trade over the counter or on the floor
would depend on the level of interest in the shares. If only large and
sophisticated investors were interested in trading in trust shares, then the shares
would trade in "customized" over-the-counter transactions without listing on
any public securities exchange.
Several institutions would have to participate in the trust share market to
establish a competitive price. Participation seems likely given the large size of
the asset pools that would be involved. The New York Stock Exchange
generally requires, for example, that shares of a listed firm have a minimum
value of as little as $9 million. 129 The Manville Trust, in contrast, was
capitalized at $5 billion-nearly three orders of magnitude greater.' Where
mass tort trust funds represented large capital pools, as they often would given
the scale of most mass torts, sophisticated market players would likely evince
interest in trading trust shares, and the market would likely have sufficient
depth and liquidity for a viable pricing process to emerge.
127. For specimens from this financial menagerie. see BANK FOR Ni"t Str"trti,it.,. RECENT
INNOVATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING 17-126 (1986) (discussing note issuanee facihttcs. currency and
interest rate swaps and options, forward rate agreements. and other instruments) flu argues, hosuc.cr, that
risk is created because the banks and other institutions trading these ne%' produts do not undertand them
See Hu, supra note 125. at 1460-63; see also John D. Finnerty. An Overrtew of Corporate Securittes
Innovation, 4 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 23 (1992) (showing types and charactenstics of innosatise hinancial
products).
128. Typically, derivative securities are bought and sold bN sophisticated end-user, The aserage
contract size of an interest rate swap in 1991, for example, was S30 million See Hu. supra note 125. at
1465 n.29. The market volume of derivatives traded "'over the counter." or off the stock exchanges. is quite
large-for selected derivatives on a "notional amount" basis, it was over $4 trilion bN ) ear-cnd 1991. more
than the combined value of all shares listed on the New York and Tokyo stock eschanges See id at
1458-60. See generally Henry T.C. Hu. New Financiul Products. tie Modern l'rme s of Financial
Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare. 69 TE-X. L RtEv 1273 (1991)
129. See INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION: STock EXCiA.GES O1 TIlE WORLD SELECTED
RULES AND REGULATIONS app. B-I (Robert C. Rosen et al. eds.. 1994); see also RInIIARD J TFWSELES ET
AL.., THE STOCK MARKET 137-38 (6th ed. 1992).
130. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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6. Risk Sharing Among Participants in the Trust Share Market
Insurance companies and pension funds seem the most probable
participants in the trust share market. These institutions have large portfolios
in which trust shares could play a useful diversification role, and they may
have a comparative advantage in analyzing the epidemiological and other
factors that would bear on trust share value. An institutional investor could
profitably use trust shares in a portfolio for hedging purposes, a typical use of
derivative products. 3 ' An investor might suppose that advances in medical
technology, for example, would reduce the harm suffered by mass tort
claimants and consequently reduce the total number of trust shares received by
tort claimants. This medical advance would make outstanding trust shares, as
pro rata claims, more valuable. Buying trust shares, therefore, would be a way
to bet on advances in medical technology. An investor could simply buy stock
in the underlying medical technology companies, of course, but like derivative
instruments, trust shares might offer a cheaper means of investing in
underlying assets than buying shares directly in the companies involved .
32
An investor might want to invest in medical progress simply because he
thought it offered attractive returns. But an investor might also want to hedge
against the risks to which medical progress exposes other parts of his portfolio.
For example, a company that is obligated to pay lifetime annuities to persons
is betting, in effect, on the reliability of actuarial estimates of the life
expectancies of its annuitants. If medical science makes unanticipated gains,
enabling annuitants to live significantly longer, the annuity obligor will suffer
unexpected liability. The company might wish to insure against this risk by
purchasing trust shares, since they are products that constitute a bet in favor
of medical progress.
t 33
Other markets and products might also evolve to allow risk-averse tort
claimants further to shed the risks caused by the mass tort. For example, some
health insurance companies might be willing to exchange whole or partial
health or disability insurance policies for trust shares. An insurance company
might believe, say, that 100,000 trust shares were worth $50,000 at a given
131. Hu, supra note 125, at 1466. Hu notes, for example, that the state of Texas purchased hedges to
guard against drops in oil prices. Id. at 1466 n.39. Airline companies insulate themselves from rises in fuel
prices by purchasing derivatives (such as call options) that rise with the price of oil. Id.
132. Id. at 1466.
133. The capital markets approach to mass tort bankruptcy would also create an incentive to conduct
research on the liability-generating effects of technologies and substances that might cause liability
sufficient to drive their producers into bankruptcy. Professor Mary Lyndon has argued that commercial
incentives are currently inadequate to cause producers of toxic chemicals to invest sufficiently in research
concerning the toxicity of chemicals. See Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity:
Designing Laws To Produce and Use Data, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 1795 (1989). Investors and potential
investors in trust shares would have strong incentives to determine the long-term effects of a toxic
chemical, even to the point, perhaps, of partially funding research. The production of this knowledge is
likely to have external social benefits, increasing society's stock of knowledge concerning the relationships
of various substances and technologies to various diseases and other forms of harm.
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time. For $50,000 in share value, the company might be willing to provide
health or disability insurance to a claimant against harms related to the tort. If
direct exchanges of this kind were not possible, many claimants would sell
their shares in order to raise cash to buy insurance policies that reduce the
risks implicit in the inevitable trust share price fluctuation. Some claimants
might want to exchange their trust shares for annuities, and insurance
companies might be interested in this commerce. Thus trust shares could well
be traded on multiple markets and have not only a cash value, but also an
exchange value for insurance products.
D. The Fairness of the Capital Markets Approach
Critics of the capital markets approach to mass tort bankruptcy may argue
that it is not fair to give claimants a marketable security, which would
undoubtedly sell on the market at a substantial discount to its face value,
instead of compensation determined by an administrative process. This
criticism might be combined with a more general skepticism about the
efficiency of the capital market or a more specific criticism about the market's
efficiency with respect to the trust shares. The soundness of these fairness
concerns depends on the form they take. Critics might merely object that the
capital markets approach would give claimants less than full compensation. In
most instances, indeed, the approach will provide less than full compensation.
This "unfairness," however, derives from the unavoidable fact that the fund
available for compensation in bankruptcy is limited. Were it not, the question
of what to do about insolvency would never arise. This limitation is a
consequence in part of other legal doctrines, such as limited corporate liability.
The problem and proposal addressed by this Article occurs within the mass tort
bankruptcy setting where, as the concept of insolvency implies, there is not
enough value available to satisfy all claimants fully. The question is how
limited funds ought to be allocated. In this Section, I first address the role of
government and second, the different forms of skepticism about capital market
efficiency.
1. The Role of Government
No minimally decent society, one might argue, would permit certain basic
needs of its citizens, such as the need for medical care, to go unmet." There
134. A similar sentiment was expressed by James S. Todd. Exccutise Vice President of the American
Medical Association, in Finding the Common Ground, The Path to Health System Reform. Address Before
the Commonwealth Club of California (Nov. 5. 1993), in 60 VITAL SPEFCHES 178 (1994) (endorsing idea
of universal access to health care): see also Susan Dentzer. Precious Principles of Health Reform. U.S
NEWs & WORLD REP., Feb. 14, 1994. at 43 (endorsing pnnciple in President Clinton's health care plan that
would guarantee all American citizens some kind of health coverage).
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is no necessary conflict between a capital markets approach to mass tort
bankruptcy and this ethical position. It may be that the capital markets
approach in a given mass tort bankruptcy would result in claimants receiving
only 10 cents on each dollar of proven claims. It is not necessary, however,
that these victims endure uncompensated 90% of their losses in order for the
capital markets approach to have its desired effects. The general population,
acting through the national government, might provide itself with insurance
against such shortfalls in compensation. The important policy point, however,
is that such supplemental mass tort bankruptcy insurance, whatever form it
takes, should be secondary to the primary compensation provided through the
capital markets approach. This is important because of the incentive effects the
capital markets approach will have on prospective mass tort bankruptcy
debtors. In the absence of a capital markets approach, a national insurance
scheme would simply make it easier for claimants like equity holders, with
claims inferior to tort claimants, to secure for themselves a disproportionate
share of the value of the debtor firm. The presence of a national insurance
scheme would ease what little pressure there currently is on present claimants,
other creditors, and the courts to give full weight to the interests of future
claimants in the mass tort bankruptcy setting. A government insurance scheme
would make easier a supposition that the pressing medical needs of future
claimants will be met. Indeed, if more of a firm's tort liability could be shifted
to a national insurance scheme, then more of the value of the debtor firm
would be available for distribution to equity holders and present claimants.
The problem with this shifting is not undercompensation of future
claimants; the problem is distortion of the incentives of equity holders and the
managers of prospective mass tort firms with respect to risk, precisely as
corporate limited liability for torts distorts incentives. 35 Limited tort liability
for large public corporations is controversial; few would argue that its
protections should be extended. If mass tort firms were able to shift the costs
of torts onto a national insurance scheme, they would depart from optimal
liability-avoidance behavior even further than they already do. To create proper
incentives, national insurance should apply only after the mass tort trust
allocates all of the assets of the mass tort firm to present claimants, future
claimants, and other creditors.
135. For a recent interesting debate on the costs, benefits, and capital market consequences of
corporate limited liability, see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991); Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of
Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387 (1992) (response to Hansmann and
Kraakman); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Do the Capital Markets Compel Limited Liability? A
Response to Professor Grundfest, 102 YALE L.J. 427 (1992); Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited
Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1992) (response to Hansmann
and Kraakman); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, A Procedural Focus on Unlimited Shareholder
Liability, 106 HARV. L. REV. 446 (1992) (response to Alexander and Grundfest).
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The capital markets approach would reveal the extent to which a
bankruptcy plan undercompensated mass tort claimants. Revealing
undercompensation, however, does not make the capital markets approach
responsible for it. If undercompensation represents a sufficiently compelling
moral and political problem, it can, and should, be addressed directly by
legislation.
2. The Problem of Inefficient Capital Markets
Some criticism of the capital markets approach is based on skepticism
about the efficiency of capital markets. Emboldened by the capital markets
events of October 1987, some commentators have argued in both the
finance 36  and the law review'37  literature that capital markets suffer
irrationalities that distort prices away from their efficient levels. Significant
irrationality in the market for trust shares, if it occurred, could lead to unfair
results. If the market priced trust shares at significantly less than their actual
liquidation value, claimants and purchasers of trust shares who held their
shares until liquidation would receive a windfall.
An adequate response to criticism in this naive form is that it is unlikely
that someone will "somehow know" that the implicit market estimate of mass
136. In the last several years. especially those since the market events of October 1987. criticisms of
the efficient capital markets hypothesis have appeared frequently in the finance literature- See. e.g . Fischer
Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN 529 (1986); Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler. Does the Stck .,tarket
Overreact?, 40 J. FIN. 793 (1985) [hereinafter De Bondt & Thaler. Does the Stock Market Overreact'l.
Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Further Evidence on Investor Overreaction and Stock larket
Seasonality, 42 J. FIN. 557 (1987) [hereinafter De Bondt & Thaler. Further Evidence on Overreactionl,
Robert A. Haugen et al., The Effect of Volothtv Changes on the Level of Stock Prices and Subsequent
Expected Returns. 46 J. FIN. 985 (1991); Wayne Joerding. Are Stock Prices Excessivels, Sensttive to Current
Information?. 9 J. ECON. BEHAv. & ORGANIZATION 71 (1988); Simon M. Keane. Paradox it the Current
Crisis in Efficient Market Theory, J. PORTFOLIO MG MIT.. W\inter 1991. at 30; Allan W Klesdon. Anomalies
in Financial Economics: Blueprint for Change?. 59 J. BUS. 469 (1986): Charles M C Lee et al . Anomalies
Closed-End Mutual Funds. J. ECON. PERSP.. Fall 1990, at 153: Bruce N. Lehmann. Fads. Martingales. and
Market Efficiency, 105 Q.J. ECON. I (1990); Edward M. Miller. Bounded Efficient Markets. A New Wrinkle
to the EMH, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Summer 1987. at 4: John O*Bnen & Sanjay Snvastava. Dynamic Stock
Markets with Multiple Assets: An Experimental Analysts. 46 J. FIN 1811 (1991). Robert J Shiller,
Speculative Prices and Popular Models, J. EcON. PERSP.. Spring 1990. at 55; Andrei Shlcifer & Lawrence
H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, J. ECON. PERSP.. Spring 1990. at 19; Jeremy Stein.
Overreactions in the Options Market, 44 J. FIN. 1011 (1989); Lawrence H. Summers. Does the Stock
Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591 (1986); Jack L. Treynor. Market Effictenc
and the Bean Jar Experiment, FIN. ANALYSTS J.. May-June 1987, at 50; Langdon B Wheeler. The
Oscillation of Systems: The Missing Link Between Price VolatiY and Market Effictencl. FIN ANALYSTS
J., July-Aug. 1989, at 7.
137. Criticisms of ECMH have found their way from the finance literature into the law review
literature. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 VA
L. REV. 945 (1991); Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments. Speculation. or Gambling '-Derivative
Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets. 86 N'v U L_ REV
987 (1992); Thomas Lee Hazen. The Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotnn*y and Investment Theor'
Implications for Securities Market Regulation and for Corporate Lav. 70 N.C L REv 137 (199 1); Donald
C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency" Revisited. 140 U PA
L. REv. 851 (1992).
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tort damages is wrong, at least not for long. Persons who know that the market
has erred in pricing trust shares have valuable knowledge on which they have
every incentive to trade. Market mechanisms exist that will propagate this
information through the capital market and push the price of trust shares to its
appropriate level.
138
In light of recent work by financial economists, however, more
sophisticated criticisms are possible. Some economists argue that market prices
of assets can linger at inefficient levels because, for example, of "noise"
trading, 139 or overreaction by traders to information. 40 The criticism of
efficient capital markets most pertinent to the capital markets approach,
however, has to do with the so-called "closed-end fund anomaly."
A liquidating trust that issues marketable shares on a diversified fund, but
does not provide redemption rights according to a preset formula, resembles
a "closed-end fund." A closed-end fund is a fairly popular investment vehicle
that comprises a pool of marketable securities, usually stocks or bonds, in
which investors buy shares. Shares in a closed-end fund, as distinguished from
shares in an open-end fund, are not redeemable. While open-end fund investors
may present their shares to the fund for redemption at an amount close to their
net asset value per share, investors in closed-end funds who want to liquidate
their investment must sell their shares into the market. Closed-end fund
shareholders, therefore, are in exactly the same position as common
shareholders in a public corporation. Moreover, closed-end funds typically do
not offer shares on a continuous basis throughout their existence.""'
It is well established that shares of closed-end funds generally sell at a
substantial discount to their actual value. 42  This value is readily
138. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 96.
139. See Shleifer & Summers, supra note 136.
140. See De Bondt & Thaler, Does the Stock Market Overreact?, supra note 136; De Bondt & Thaler,
Further Evidence on Overreaction, supra note 136.
141. The proposed mass tort trust would not resemble a closed-end fund in this respect. The trust
would continuously issue shares to compensate claimants who had had their claims liquidated. In this
respect, the trust more closely resembles the traditional open-end mutual fund, which is open in the sense
that it continues to issue shares after the initial issuance. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.125(c) (1993) (defining open-
end mutual fund and closed-end investment fund).
142. See Abraham Abraham et al., Does Sentiment Explain Closed-End Fund Discounts? Evidence
from the Bond Funds, 28 FIN. REV. 607 (1993) (recounting long-standing puzzle of closed-end fund
discounts and arguing that existence of small premiums for closed-end bond funds suggests that discounts
are not due to systematic risk); Kenneth J. Boudreaux, Discounts and Premiums on Closed-End Mutual
Funds: A Study in Valuation, 28 J. FIN. 515 (1973); James A. Brickley & James S. Schallheim, Lifting the
Lid on Closed-End Investment Companies: A Case of Abnormal Returns, 20 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 107 (1985); Nai-fu Chen et al., Are the Discounts on Closed-End Funds a Sentiment Index? 48
J. FIN. 795 (1993) (rejecting claim that discount is attributable to small investor sentiment); Navin Chopra
et al., Yes, Discounts on Closed-End Funds are a Sentiment Index, 48 J. FIN. 801 (1993) (defending
argument that closed-end fund discounts are due to irrational sentiments of small investors); J. Bradford
De Long & Andrei Shleifer, Closed-End Fund Discounts, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Winter 1992, at 46 (tracing
history of discount and arguing that discount is due to sentiments of small investors); Charles M.C. Lee
et al., Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle, 46 J. FIN. 75 (1991) (presenting evidence that
discount fluctuations are caused by changes in investor sentiment); David C. Leonard & Nicholas R. Noble,
Estimation of 77me-Varying Systematic Risk and Investment Performance: Closed-End Investment
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determinable because closed-end funds consist of securities that trade in other
markets. Financial newspapers commonly publish prices of closed-end fund
shares and the net asset value of the funds per share."'3 These figures
frequently diverge; the closed-end fund share price usually is lower than the
net asset value of the fund per share. The reasons for this discount are
suffic ently mysterious for the phenomenon to merit the moniker of the
"closed-end fund anomaly." Some empirical studies show that the discount is
not the result of misinformation about the underlying value of fund assets; nor
do tax liabilities and management costs fully explain the discrepancy."
When closed-end funds liquidate or convert into open-end mutual funds, the
discount typically disappears. 4 5 Some evidence suggests that discounts like
those of closed-end funds might be widespread in the capital markets.'
Commentators unwilling to abandon the standard account of pricing in
financial markets tend to attribute the closed-end fund discount to doubts about
the future performance of fund managers.' 7 Other commentators view the
discount as evidence that the standard model of pricing in financial markets is
fundamentally flawed."'5
If discounts of this kind affected trust shares, distributional problems might
arise. The existence of a discount would mean the full value of the debtor's
assets was not made available to claimants. Rather, the amount available would
be the full amount in the trust, discounted by some amount attributable to the
structure of the fund and financial market operations. This discounting would
mean that the structure of the trust itself causes a misallocation, unfairly
penalizing some claimants for selling their shares before liquidation, and
unfairly rewarding other claimants and trust share purchasers for holding their
shares until the trust liquidated.
Companies. 4 J. FIN. RES. 109 (1981): Burton G. Malkiel. 77Te Vauhjtion t Closed-End
Investment-Company Shares, 32 J. FIN. 847. 847 (1977); Rex Thompson. The Infornation Content of
Discounts and Premiums on Closed-End Fund Shares. 6 J. FIN EcoN 151. 180-82 (1978) (describing
heterogeneous demands as possible source of closed-end funds discount).
143. The Wall Street Journal currently does so on Mondays
144. See Morris Mendelson. Closed-End Fund Discounts Revisited. FI REv . Spring 1978. at 48.
53-56. But see Raman Kumar & Gregory M. Noronha. A Re-Exanunattrion of the Relationship Betheen
Closed-End Fund Discounts and Expenses, 15 J. FIN. RiES. 139 (1992) (noting that better specltication of
expense variable indicates that discounts are strongly related to expenses of fund management)
145. Greggory A. Brauer, "Open-Ending" Closed-End Funds. 13 J FIN ECON 491. 503-06 (1984)
146. For an interesting treatment of discounts in a variety of capital-market contexts. see Reimer
Kraakman. Taking Discounts Seriously: The hnplications of 'Discounted" Share Prices as an Acquisition
Motive. 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891 (1988).
147. See, e.g., Boudreaux. supra note 142. at 517; Rodney L Roenfeldt & Donald L, Tuttle, An
Examination of the Discounts and Premiums of Closed-End Intesinent Companies. I J BUS. RES 129
(1973) (arguing that discounts reflect market expectations of poor perfomiance by fund manager-)
148. See. e.g., Thompson, supra note 142, at 182 (arguing that discount reflects either failure of two-
parameter asset pricing theory or market inefficiency). see also Eugene J Pratt. f'lsths Associated with
Closed-End Investment Company Discounts, FIN. ANALYSTS J . July-Aug, 1966. at 79 (attributing discount
to lack of selling efforts and to public misunderstanding about nature of closed-end funds)
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These problems, if they exist, cannot be solved consistently with the
capital markets approach by making the trust an open-end rather than a closed-
end fund. In an open-end fund, shareholders have the right to redeem their
shares with the fund at something close to the net asset value per share.
Naturally, there is little discrepancy between the market prices of shares in an
open-end fund and that fund's net asset value per share. Making a mass tort
trust an open-end fund, however, would defeat the solution to the fair
distribution problem that the capital markets approach proposes. If present
claimants could redeem their shares for the net asset value per share of the
trust fund on the basis of the number of shares that had already been issued
by that time, they would receive a distribution that would fail to take into
account the number and magnitude of future claims that the capital market
expected to emerge over the life of the trust fund. Redemption would therefore
lead, in all likelihood, to overcompensation of present claimants. Attempting
to use an administrative formula that would make the value of the redemption
right turn on the trust's (rather than the capital market's) expectations
concerning future claims would introduce the same set of problems to which
mass tort trusts are now subject, and which the capital markets approach set
out to resolve in the first place.
Careful design of the trust fund can probably ameliorate any closed-end
fund discount effect. The trust fund under the capital markets approach should
not have certain features common to closed-end funds, features that are likely
responsible for part of the discount. First, antitakeover devices frequently
protect the managers of closed-end funds. 149 These devices are likely to
increase both monitoring costs and the risk of mismanagement, misinvestment,
and misappropriation by trust managers, thereby reducing the value of closed-
end fund shares.50 While the terms of the instrument setting up the mass tort
trust must be inviolable in order to prevent opportunism by present
claimant/trust shareholders against future claimant/trust shareholders-to-be, trust
shares nevertheless should embody limited voting powers to enable
shareholders to replace incompetent or dishonest management. Shareholders
should, at a minimum, be able to elect directors and remove them for cause.
These customary shareholder rights' 5' will help prevent some forms of
149. See Mendelson, supra note 144, at 67.
150. These effects have been observed in financial institutions. See Christopher James, An Analysis
of the Effect of State Acquisition Laws on Managerial Efficiency: The Case of the Bank Holding Company
Acquisitions, 27 J.L. & ECON. 211, 226 (1984) (concluding that salary expenses, occupancy expense, and
total employment are higher for banks in states prohibiting acquisitions than for banks in states not
restricting acquisitions); Mary S. Schranz, Takeovers Improve Firm Performance: Evidence from the
Banking Industry, 101 J. POL. ECON. 299, 323 (1993) (concluding that banks are less profitable in states
that restrict bank acquisitions, even when state provides other incentives to managers).
151. The right to remove a director for cause is among the most basic rights of shareholders in a
corporation. See, e.g., Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 857-58 (Del. Ch. 1957).
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opportunism by the trustees. Second, any closed-end fund discount might be
mitigated by specifying a liquidation date in the terms of the trust.'"
Finally, a large part of the closed-end fund problem could be eliminated
by designing the trust so that the trust fund consisted entirely of risk-free
investments, such as U.S. Treasury securities. There is some evidence that
closed-end bond funds sell not at a discount, but at a small premium to their
underlying value.' 53 A trust fund composed of U.S. Treasury obligations
would presumably behave more like a closed-end bond fund than like a closed-
end equity fund. Moreover, this portfolio, which would be required to remain
as risk-free as possible, would give the trust managers little opportunity to
incur the management costs to which closed-end investment funds are
subject-costs that some recent commentators believe account for a significant
part of the discount.'54 By greatly reducing both legitimate management costs
and management opportunism, this investment strategy would probably also
reduce any closed-end fund discount that might exist on trust shares because
of their lack of a redemption feature.
3. Administrative and Capital Markets Approaches as Risk Management
Even with the features suggested above, there is, of course, no absolute
guarantee that trust shares will sell at a price that accurately reflects all
information, or even all publicly available information, that bears on the
ultimate magnitude of the mass tort debtor's liability to present and future
claimants. Indeed, critics of ECMH have gathered evidence suggesting that
capital markets are not absolutely efficient." 5 Even if capital markets are not
perfectly efficient, however, the capital markets approach will still be superior
to administrative approaches; and it is the irrationalities inherent in
administrative approaches with which capital market irrationalities must be
152. See Brauer, supra note 145; see also Greggory A Brauer. Closed.End Fund Shares' Abnormal
Returns and the Informatton Content of Discounts and Premiums. 43 J. Fir 113 (1988) (discussing
valuation effects of probability of fund opening).
153. See Abraham et al., supra note 142. at 611. Casual empiricism, howcser suggests that discounts
on closed-end bond funds are common. Recently, closed-end bond funds were selling at a discount of 1.4%
to their net asset value, compared to a 4.2% discount for closed-end stock funds. WALL ST. J.. July 7. 1994.
at R13.
154. See Kumar & Noronha, supra note 144.
155. See sources cited supra note 136. A relevant kind of capital-market imperfection might be evident
in the apparent inability of the stock market and bond rating agencies to identify problems in large bank
holding companies in the 1980's. See Richard E. Randall. Can tie Market Evaluate Asset Qualiy Exposure
in Banks?, NEW ENG. ECON. REV.. July/Aug. 1989. at 3. 18 (documenting market's failure to predict bank
holding company problems of 1980's until after damage was done). Banks. however, probably face greater
principal-agent problems than would a mass tort trust. The asset pool of the latter would be relatively
simple in comparison; a mass tort trust would emphasize the minimization of risk. and it ssould not
compete for deposits, loans, and profits. Nor would a trust's managers have much opportunity to conceal
risk. Cf John Kambhu, Concealment of Risk and Regulation of Bank Risk Taking. 2 J. REG. Eco.N 397
(I 990) (discussing concealment of risk that is endemic in banking industry). As I note above, mass tort trust
directors should have minimal discretion. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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compared. The question, then, is not whether the capital markets approach is
absolutely efficient or rational; rather, the question is whether the capital
markets approach can allocate available funds to claimants more fairly and
with lower transaction costs than can' administrative approaches. The intuitive
case is strong that while the capital markets approach will not be perfectly
efficient, it will be more efficient than any administrative alternative.
The main argument for the relative efficiency of the capital markets
approach lies in a comparison of the ability of the two contending approaches
to process relevant information. Taking account of both existing and new
information by administrative means is quite costly. How costly is difficult to
predict, but the administration of mass tort bankruptcy funds historically has
involved huge transaction costs. 156 In the Manville reorganization, as much
as two-thirds of the trust fund was spent on the transaction costs of allocating
the remaining third to claimants.'57 Reformers might be able to reduce these
costs, it should be noted, by streamlining the tort system and by using
alternative dispute resolution techniques, scheduled damages, and other cost-
saving measures."' The proper comparison is thus perhaps between some
reformed administrative approach and the capital markets approach. Because
this is a comparison of two hypothetical entities, any conclusions will be
somewhat speculative.
Comparison of capital markets and administrative approaches is
complicated by the fact that when prospective mass tort claimants choose rules
for mass tort bankruptcy compensation, they are essentially making a risk-
management decision; they are deciding what portion of the mass tort firm's
value will be spent to ensure that compensation is independent of the timing
of a claim. If the prospective tort claimants adopt an administrative approach,
they decide to pay administrators to use their information-processing
capabilities to allocate the available funds fairly. If they choose a capital
markets approach, they pay arbitrageurs for the same service. One dimension
of comparison between administrative approaches and capital markets
156. An often-cited 1984 Rand study concluded that for every dollar paid to compensate an asbestos
plaintiff, an additional $1.59 was spent on litigation and transaction costs. JAMES S. KAKALIK 13T AL.,
VARIATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES 91 (1984). Judge Weinstein has stated
that, "including overheads, insurance costs and expenditures for courts, the percentage available to plaintiffs
is probably closer to 30 cents for every dollar expended." In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129
B.R. 710, 749 (Bankr. E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992),
modified, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993). The Manville Trust "was spending approximately one million dollars
a week on outside counsel litigation defense costs alone in 1990 in addition to its own staff counsel and
overhead costs at a time when it had almost no unrestricted cash." Id. at 750. Most of these costs, of
course, are due to the expensive nature of tort litigation. Under the capital markets approach, some of these
costs would still accrue if litigation were used to liquidate claims. These costs might be substantially
eliminated by awarding tort claimants a scheduled amount derived from historical averages of jury awards
and settlements for similar claims.
157. 129 B.R. at 749.
158. This approach is the one taken by the proposed class action settlement between the 20 defendant




approaches, therefore, should be the relative size of this payment-the portion
of available funds used to pay administrators, in the former case, and the
portion of the terminal value of the trust fund that becomes the profit of
arbitrageurs. in the latter case. To the extent the capital market irrationally
discounts the value of trust shares (for example, because the trust is a closed-
end fund), we may assume arbitrageurs holding trust shares at the liquidation
of the trust will profit.5 9 Thus, the deeper this discount is, the higher the
risk-management costs associated with the capital markets approach will be.
The magnitude of these charges, however, is not the only basis of
comparison. Administrative and capital markets approaches must also be
compared in terms of the quality of risk management they provide. The quality
of risk management, for this particular purpose, might be thought of as a
measure of how evenly the respective compensatory schemes spread out the
funds available from the debtor, net of the risk-management charge, among all
claimants, present and future. Thus, skewing toward present claimants under
administrative approaches reduces quality of risk management. Noise in capital
markets that randomly benefits claimants who sell at one time, while
penalizing claimants who sell at another time, also reduces the quality of risk
management.
In using a hypothetical contract approach, we are asking what sort of risk-
management scheme prospective mass tort bankruptcy claimants would prefer
to buy. Extremely risk-averse prospective tort claimants might opt for an
administrative approach, even if its premium were much higher than that of the
capital markets approach, if they thought administrators could guarantee that
compensation would in no event be less than a very low minimum. It seems
implausible, however, that rule choosers would be this risk averse, given that
they would make their decisions in light of existing social insurance
schemes.' 6 As I have argued, even if they were extremely risk averse,
administrative approaches can hardly make a credible guarantee of even a
minimum compensation for disempowered future claimants, which prospective
claimants will worry they might become.
While many of the relevant quantities in this comparison are likely to
remain elusive, the reaction of the Manville Trust to unanticipated events
vividly illustrates the shortcomings of administrative processes in responding
to new information. The confirmation of the Manville Plan was based on the
estimate that there would be a total of 83,000 claimants against Manville.
During the pendency of the bankruptcy, more claimants emerged and Manville
had to revise its estimate to 100,000. Manville persuaded the court that claims
should be valued initially at $25,000 each, and that claims would increase at
159. Tort claimants holding trust shares at the liquidation of the trust will also profit because they bore
market risk and effectively acted as arbitrageurs.
160. Medicare and Medicaid. for example.
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4% per year.' 6' Notwithstanding these estimates, the Trust soon began
settling the claims of present claimants for far more than it could afford, given
its looming liability to future claimants. Claims adjusters used rough,
handwritten file summaries and made little use of the sophisticated
spreadsheets for which the Trust had paid outside information-processing
consultants millions of dollars. 62 According to Judge Weinstein, "Trust
personnel made little effective effort to apportion available cash among total
anticipated assets or to maintain the $25,000 average claim payment level
relied upon in devising the Plan."' 163 The response of Trust personnel to the
unanticipated flood of claims was not to pay present claimants less than the
originally budgeted $25,000 per claim, but to pay an average liquidated value
per claim of almost 70% more than that."6 Thus the Trust was paying out
far more than it could afford to pay out, even under the grossly optimistic
assumptions on which the plan of reorganization was based.
While the Manville experience was unique in some respects, it illustrates
the inefficiencies of real-life administrative processes. These inefficiencies are
of an entirely different order of magnitude than those some financial
economists discern in the capital markets.' 65 When their own experience
indicated that the Manville Plan greatly underestimated future liability, Trust
administrators paid present claimants not less, but more. It is difficult to
believe that capital markets, even concededly imperfect capital markets, would
be this irrational.
161. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 755 (Bankr. E. & S.D.N.Y 1991)
(."The evidence submitted by [Manville] . . . provides a reasonable estimation, based upon known present
claimants and reasonable extrapolations from past experience and epidemiological data, of the number and
amount of asbestos-related claims that the AH Trust will be required to satisfy."') (quoting In re
Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 635 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 78 B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd
sub nom. Kane v. Johns-Mansville Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988)), vacated on other grounds, 982
F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), modified, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993).
162. Id. at 755-56.
163. Id. at 757.
164. Id. at 758 (noting that average liquidated value of each claim amounted to $42,128 while original
projection was $25,000 per claim). Judge Weinstein's opinion described this as a 40% increase.
165. A more typical attitude is evinced by Burton G. Malkiel, having reviewed the evidence (as of
March 1989) for capital market inefficiencies:
So we are again driven back to the position of [efficient market hypothesis]. Pricing
irregularities may well exist and even persist for periods of time, and markets can at times be
influenced by fads and fashions. Eventually, however, any excesses in market valuations will
be corrected. Undoubtedly, with the passage of time and with the increasing sophistication of
our databases and empirical techniques, we will document further departures from efficiency
and understand their causes more fully. But I suspect that the end result will not be an
abandonment of the belief of many in the profession that the stock market is remarkably
efficient in its use of information.
Burton G. Malkiel, Is the Stock Market Efficient?, 243 SCIENCE 1313, 1318 (1989).
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IV. THE CAPITAL MARKETS APPROACH AND UNCERTAINTrY
ABOUT INSOLVENCY
Thus far I have assumed that the mass tort firm has incurred so much tort
liability that it is certainly insolvent, even if we cannot now know with
certainty the total mass tort liability and how it will be distributed among
present and future claimants. In this Part, I relax this assumption and consider
how the capital markets approach might deal with the more complex setting
where substantial uncertainty exists about whether tort liability is so large that
the mass tort firm is insolvent.
Before considering uncertainty about insolvency, however, I address briefly
the situation where there is uncertainty only about whether the entire value of
the firm will be needed to satisfy obligations to tort claimants. An uncertainty
problem can arise even when the solvency of the mass tort firm is certain. If
the firm has other creditors with priority equal to tort creditors, or if a reform
of bankruptcy law gave tort creditors priority over other creditors, there may
be uncertainty about how much of a solvent firm's assets should be allocated
to tort creditors, and how much to other creditors. I argue in Section A that a
fair distribution between tort and nontort creditors of equal priority can be
achieved by issuing both sorts of creditors trust shares in the mass tort
bankruptcy trust. Also, if Congress ever makes tort claims superior to contract
claims in bankruptcy, bankruptcy plans could achieve fair distribution by
issuing contract creditors a class of shares in the trust that are junior to those
issued to tort creditors. The capital markets would price the two classes of trust
shares according to its judgment of the severity of the mass tort. The inferior
class trust shares would have a positive value only if the capital markets
determined that the trust contained sufficient funds to pay fully the tort
creditors.
In Section B, I offer a tentative application of the capital markets approach
to the difficult question of how mass tort bankruptcy should be triggered. The
question of when to trigger bankruptcy is especially difficult in the mass tort
context because there may be significant uncertainty about whether the mass
tort firm is actually insolvent. Some bankruptcy scholars have argued that mass
tort bankruptcy should be triggered early to prevent opportunism by firm
managers, shareholders, present claimants, and contract creditors. I propose that
a mass tort firm should issue to tort claimants "tort bonds"-securities
representing a claim on the assets of a mass tort firm senior to all other
claims-at an intermediate stage short of conventional bankruptcy. After this
injection of a senior layer of tort claims into the firm's capital structure, the
market price of the mass tort firm's equity will provide valuable information
about the firm's solvency. A capital markets pricing mechanism will be a more
reliable signal for triggering bankruptcy than would a court's estimation that
mass tort claims had reached some substantial percentage of the firm's value.
1994]
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A. Tranches of Trust Shares and Priority in Bankruptcy
If the court establishes a mass tort trust when a debtor is reorganized and
only places part of the firm's assets in the trust, reserving the rest for other
creditors, nontort creditors will have many of the same incentives and strategic
advantages that equity holders have and may try to grab for themselves value
that rightfully belongs to future claimants. As in the example in Part 11,166
where equity holders kept for themselves 20% of the value of a firm, all of
which should have been used to satisfy tort claims, holders of subordinate debt
securities can bargain for a share of the debtor's value at the expense of
underrepresented future tort claimants.1 67 The capital markets approach
suggests a natural solution to the difficult problem of allocating the value of
the firm among tiers of debt when there is substantial uncertainty about the
magnitude of one or more of these levels of claims.
Under the capital markets approach, a court should place the value of a
debtor's available assets into a trust fund and issue to claimants shares in the
trust. If general nontort creditors receive the same priority as tort creditors,
general creditors could receive trust shares in the face amount of their claims,
just as tort creditors would. This distribution would dilute the aggregate claim
of general unsecured nontort creditors by the amount of the liability for the
mass tort and by any other claims that the capital market anticipated would
emerge during the life of the trust. The life of the trust should be, as before,
sufficiently long to cover the emergence of all liability against the firm. Thus
the capital markets approach makes possible a fair allocation among any group
of creditors of the same priority. Moreover, the capital markets approach could
also be used to allocate the value of the debtor firm among claimants having
different priorities. Suppose, for example, that Congress decided to accord tort
claimants priority in bankruptcy over other unsecured or over all contract
creditors. Suppose further that there exists long-term uncertainty about the
magnitude of the liability caused by the mass tort. How should the value of the
debtor firm be allocated? In this case, the mass tort trust could issue
"tranches," or different classes, of trust shares with different priorities in their
claims against the proceeds of the future liquidation of the trust. If there were
two such classes, for example, with tort claims being the superior class, then
the tort claimants' trust shares would receive their full value before inferior
creditors would obtain anything. Payment in full of a trust share would be
166. See supra text accompanying notes 73-80.
167. Interestingly, the historical development of the absolute priority rule traces to the strategic
cooperation of senior bondholders and equity holders to "squeeze out" intermediate creditors in railroad
reorganizations. See Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy
Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 74-77 (1991); Cathy R. lies, Note, Dewsnup v. Timms:
Reinforcement or Vitiation of the "New Value Exception" to Chapter 1 's Absolute Priority Rule?, 35
ARMZ. L. REv. 489, 490-94 (1993). This is an historical analogue to the sort of strategic squeeze-out of
future tort claimants that characterizes the mass tort bankruptcy setting.
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payment not just of the principal amount (the liquidated value of the injury
determined by jury, settlement, or administrative process) but also of the
interest that had accumulated at the risk-free rate during the life of the
trust. 168 The trust would pay lower-class trust shares the same amount
(principal plus accumulated interest),' 69 but only if the trust contained
sufficient funds after superior-class (tort claimants') trust shares had been paid
in full. If the trust could only partially pay inferior-class trust share holders,
the trust would pay the inferior claimants pro rata according to the size of their
claims.
The capital markets would price the tort claimants' trust shares according
to the best available estimates of the total magnitude of mass tort liability and
the total value of the trust fund. The price of the inferior trust shares would
reflect the judgment of the capital markets as to how much money would be
left in the trust fund, if any, after the trust had fully paid off tort claimants. If
inferior-class trust shares sold for only a fraction of their face value, the low
price would reflect the judgment of the market that the mass tort trust probably
contained insufficient funds to pay off tort claimants in full. On the other hand,
if the inferior-class trust shares sold for a premium price, this would reflect the
168. For a trust share issued at the inception of the trust with a term of. say. 30 )ears. this rate (ught
approximate the yield on a 30-year U.S. Treasury STRIP (Separate Trading of Registered Interest and
Principal), the close equivalent of a zero-coupon bond issued by the U S Treasury Dr Marcia Stigum
notes that "STRIPs have a lot of appeal to a wide array of investors. They are a pure product about shich
an investor needn't do a lot of thinking. He knows that. if he in% ests X dollars toda). he %%ill get Y dollars
at the end of some known time. T." MARCIA STIGUM. TIlE MONEY MARKtZ 692 i3d cd 1990)
(authoritative "bible" describing institutional detail of money market). Goldman Sachs reported that the
yield (bid) on a STRIP (principal) due in February of 2019 was 8.83%. Id. at 700 More recently these
"19's" have been yielding around 7.25%, probably because of a cooling of inflationar) expectations See,
e.g., Treasury Bonds, Notes and Bills. WALL ST. J., Mar. 8. 1994. at C2 1 Trust shares issued later in the
life of the trust could bear lower interest rates, perhaps corresponding to the rate on U S Treasur) STRIP,
of a similarly shorter term. See supra part III.B.
Trust shares would not be exactly like STRIPs and other zero-coupon instrument. i ho ver. in the
sense that STRIPs and zero-coupon instruments are pure discount instruments. s hereas trust shares s.ould
have an imputed interest rate that would accumulate and be paid. subject to asailability of funds, at the
liquidation of the trust. The closest analogue to trust shares might be the Series EE U S Sa% ings Bond Set-
infra note 178. Instead of a floating rate like the Savings Bond. however, trust shares could tse a samplcr
approach. The yield-to-maturity of a STRIP could be used as an approximation of the rate that should hae
to be paid on the face amount of the trust share so that if the trust fund paid all claims. the trust share
would sell at its face value (equivalent to full compensation for the claimant) upon it% issuance Thus, a
STRIP is a promise by the U.S. Treasury to pay you SY dollars in. say. 20 )ears It sells at SX dollar,
today, and this discount might be equivalent to a yield of. say. 5%. If the U S. Treasury instead promise-,
to pay you SY plus 5% cumulative interest at the end of 20 years, then that promise should sell upon
issuance for SY (and for more as its maturity approaches). More sophisticated designs could better account
for inflation risk, but this simple design conveys my basic point: To the extent the trust %hares sell for less
than SY at issuance, the discount reflects the capital markets expectation that there ill not be enough
money in the trust to pay all trust share holders the full face amount plus interest.
169. The correct approach to contractual debt in this setting would be to liquidate the claim at the
nominal value indicated by the terms of the debt contract. Most debt contracts pros ide for acceleration ol
interest, for example, upon event of default. The amount due to the creditor upon event of default Aould
be assumed to bear interest at the risk-free rate. just as would the trust shares- Accordingly. the nominal
value of the debt contract would receive pro rata treatment with other negotiated contracts of the same
class.
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judgment of the market that the trust contained sufficient funds to distribute
to claimants of a lower priority. This approach is highly flexible and could
accommodate a number of priorities. It deploys the superior information-
processing capability and objectivity of the capital markets to allocate the value
of the debtor among sets of claimants of different priority. In cases where the
claims of creditors might exhaust the debtor firm's value, the trust could also
issue trust shares to equity holders in the debtor firm-trust shares entitling the
equity holders to receive the residuum of the trust fund after the trust satisfied
all creditors' claims. If the capital market determined that some value would
remain after these claims had been paid, the former equity holders would be
able to sell their trust shares for a positive amount.
70
B. A Capital Markets Approach to Uncertainly Concerning Insolvency
My discussion of the capital markets approach has so far assumed that all
of the debtor firm's value would be used to finance a trust fund for the
compensation of tort claimants, or tort claimants and other claimants of equal
or lower priority. This assumption simplifies the discussion considerably. If
tort plus other liabilities will certainly exceed firm value, even if it is uncertain
by how much, then there is only one problem to solve. One must determine
how to allocate the firm's assets to tort claimants, or to tort and other
claimants, but one does not need to determine what portion of the firm's assets
should be used to satisfy creditors. We know the answer to the latter question
by hypothesis: All of the firm's assets should go to satisfy creditors.
If there is uncertainty about whether the value of aggregate tort claims
exceeds firm value, however, designing appropriate mass tort procedures and
institutions becomes more complicated. I provide in this Section a tentative
outline of how the capital markets approach might produce a reasonably good
solution to this problem. Here my proposal extends beyond the current bounds
170. Multiple classes of trust shares, however, do raise some difficult and interesting problems of fair
allocation. Suppose the trust issues two classes of trust shares, A and B, with A being thosuperior class,
and that the size of the trust and magnitude of claims are such that the B class trust shareholders are
effectively the residual claimants of the trust. B class trust shareholders are then analogous to shareholders
in a leveraged firm, which carries debt superior to equity. Because leveraged equity is analogous to a call
option on the value of the firm, standard option pricing models are instructive here. Of special interest is
the phenomenon predicted by option pricing theory called "time decay," which is the tendency of options
to be more valuable, all other things being equal, the further they are from their exercise date. This suggests
that even if the expected total magnitude of Class B liability remains constant, the Class B claimant who
gets her trust share in year one will be able to sell it for more per dollar of underlying claim than will the
Class B claimant who received her trust share in year 20. See RICHARD M. BOOKSTABER, OPTION PRICING
AND INVESTMENT STRATEGIES 106-10 (1991) (discussion of "theta strategies" that use positive and negative
biases in theta, or change in price relative to time to maturity, to construct hedge positions). The existence
of time decay would raise temporal fairness problems, and suggests that tort claimants with temporally
extended claims should not be divided into multiple classes with different priorities. Commentators have
suggested prioritizing mass tort claims, for example, according to severity of illness. See, e.g., Peter X.
Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARV. J.L. & Pmo.
POL'Y 541 (1992).
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of bankruptcy law. 7' It might best be implemented as part of a separate
chapter of federal bankruptcy law that replaces or supplements Chapter 11 in
mass tort cases.
1. Tort Bonds
When the insolvency of a mass tort firm is certain, the capital markets
approach uses capital markets to estimate the magnitude of future harms.
Because all of the mass tort firm's assets must be allocated to tort claimants
and other creditors, there is no need to determine what portion of those assets
should be used for that purpose. When insolvency is uncertain, the capital
markets approach can mediate uncertainty about both the value of future tort
claims and the value of the assets against which tort victims have a claim. The
capital market can determine what portion of the value of the mass tort firm
a trust should commit to satisfying tort claims.
Under the capital markets approach, when the insolvency of the mass tort
firm is uncertain, the firm should issue to tort claimants marketable securities
that have a claim on the value of the firm that is superior to all classes of
171. Roe also discusses the problems raised by uncertainty concerning insohency Roe, supra note
62, at 874-86. Roe thinks the main difficulty in cases of uncertainty concerning insolcnc) is a "disparity
problem." Suppose, for example, that a firm commits a mass ton that has an equal probability of causing
harm of either SI billion or S3 billion. If the firm contributes the expected claims saluc of S2 billion to a
compensatory trust, then ex post disparity between the size of the actual harm and the funds actually in the
trust will emerge. The trust will either undercompensate (tif claims are S3 billion) or o%crcompensate if
claims are SI billion) tort claimants. One could postpone determination of the firm's contribution untl the
amount of claims was more certain, but Roe stresses that delay would increase the mass tort lirm's
"operational costs," that is, the firm's costs of having to operate under the cloud of large and uncertain
liabilities. Id. at 876-79. To mitigate this problem. Roe suggests that the firm place in trust for tort
claimants the expected value of the tort claims structured as a combination of the firt's debt and equity
The trust should contain debt equal to the minimum expected value of the liability (S2 billion in the
example), and equity in an amount equal to the difference between the maximum expected value of tort
claims and the amount of debt (an additional $I billion in equity). By contributing both stock and debt. the
firm increases the chances that ex post the value of the firm's contribution and the %alue of claims will
match. Id.
Such structured financing of mass tort trust funds, however. is problematic Roe's proposal contains
no market process for determining the expected value of tort claims. The total amount contributed to the
compensatory trust and the terms of its payout will be subject to all of the undesirable psychological.
institutional, and strategic influences detailed in Part II.A. More important. Roe's formulation of the
problem of uncertainty about insolvency as an ex post "disparity problem" misconceiscs. in my view, the
main issue in mass tort bankruptcy. The main issue is not whether a disparity cxists et post, but rather, who
should bear the risk ofa future about which no one can be certain. Risk is something that exists only from
the ex ante perspective. The issue is not how to fund the compensatory trust so that er post it has the "best
fit" with the actual value of tort claims. In fact. Roe's proposal would make matters worse in terms of risk
Readers armed with calculators can readily determine for themseles that the sanances of the %alue of
Roe's structured trusts are greater than the value variances of trusts consisting simply of the expected value
of tort damages. Roe's better retrospective "fit" of trust value with actual tort damages has the cost of
imposing risk on tort claimants that they would not ex ante choose to bear Indeed. it is not clear what
social policy would be served by retroactively matching trust value with damages in this way The effect
would be to divide the risk that the value of the firm's assets will differ from the magnitude of tort claims
between tort claimants and other interested parties. such as equity holders of the nass tort firm This nsk
allocation is unfair. Tort claimants are involuntary creditors and should not be made to bear any risk not
necessary for the treatment of tort claimants as equals.
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equity and all other classes of debt.172 Because the securities would be a
form of debt used for compensating tort claimants, they could be called "tort
bonds." To prevent equity holders acting through firm management from
effectively subordinating tort bonds to equity or new debt, the firm should
issue tort bonds pursuant to an indenture that makes all other claims inferior
and forbids the payment of dividends, the repurchase of stock, the issuance of
debt equal or superior to the bonds, and all other board actions that would
impair the value of the bonds.77 This set of prohibited actions should include
paying present tort claimants in cash, which, given the substantial doubt about
the firm's continued solvency, would have the effect of overcompensating
present claimants if the payments rendered the firm insolvent before it could
fully compensate future claimants.
The indenture would in effect transform the operating mass tort firm into
a kind of trust for the tort claimants. This indenture, like the trust fund, should
have a term at least equal to the maximum expected period of time over which
the injuries caused by the tort would manifest themselves. While secured debt
that already exists at the time the tortfeasor issues the bonds could remain
superior to the tort bonds, legislation giving these tort bond claims priority
over all contract creditors, including secured creditors, would be desirable.'
The indenture, like the mass tort trust, should specify that the claims of holders
of tort bonds against the value of the firm are subject to dilution by the
issuance of additional tort bonds and would be paid pro rata with all other tort
bonds issued during the term of the indenture.
172. 1 assume that law reform would make tort claims embodied in tort bonds superior to contract
claims. The capital markets approach could be used without this reform, but the inferior priority of tort
bonds might result in temporal justice problems of the sort I am striving to eliminate. See supra text
accompanying notes 162-67. If these effects are counted as trivial, then the approach could be implemented
without making tort bonds superior to other debt. The bankruptcy trustee could pay off separately secured
and other claims superior to tort claims, and place only the remainder of firm value in trust for tort
claimants. Although I concede that this alternative would require less significant changes to bankruptcy law,
I view it as inferior.
173. Many other loopholes would have to be closed. Devices for preventing opportunistic behavior
by mass tort firm managers could be modeled after trust indenture provisions developed to protect bond
holders from managerial opportunism. See Committee on Devs. in Bus. Fin., Report, Sixth Annual Review
of Developments in Business Financing, 45 Bus. LAW. 441, 454-55 (1989) (discussing emergence and
significance of "super poison puts" for protection of bond covenants). These restrictions could have
negative effects on the value of the firm to the extent that dividends constrain managerial opportunism. See
generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 650
(1984). Restrictions of this kind are necessary, however, because otherwise directors elected by equity
holders might choose to allocate firm value away from tort bond holders by declaring the maximum
dividends permitted by law.
174. I do not want to enter this separate debate here, but the proposal to give tort claimants priority
over contract creditors has wide support among commentators. See, e.g., David W. Leebron, Limited
Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLuM. L. REv. 1565, 1643-49 (1991) (arguing that tort claims
should take priority over contractual claims, including secured debt); Christopher M.E. Painter, Note, Tort
Creditor Priority in the Secured Credit System: Asbestos Times, the Worst of Times, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1045
(1984) (arguing that tort claims should have priority status). In addition to other fairness problems, leaving
secured and other contract creditors in a priority position to tort creditors might give rise to temporal justice
problems under the capital markets approach (where there is uncertainty about insolvency) because of time
decay. See supra note 170.
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Mass tort indentures of the sort I propose here might be formed under the
auspices of a federal law, such as a new chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, that
would mandate standardized terms for the indentures and the tort bonds.'-
Federal law could also specify in some detail the conditions under which tort
bonds would be issued. For example, the law might require a firm to issue tort
bonds when it accrues enough tort judgments to create a significant risk of
insolvency and inability to compensate future claimants. "6 Standard terms
for tort bonds would promote their trading on the capital market.' ' Similar
to trust shares, tort bonds would resemble "zero-coupon" instruments.
2. The Pricing of Tort Bonds
The price of tort bonds should vary, other things being equal, with two
magnitudes: the expected value of the firm's assets and the expected value of
the tort claims against the firm. If the value of the firm's assets were sufficient
to cover the entire tort liability that the capital market expected to emerge over
175. This approach could resemble that taken bN the Trust Indenture Act of 1939. Pub L No 76-253.
53 Stat. 1149 (1939) (codified as amended at 15 U S C §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1988)1 \While tile Act letaes
determination of much of the indenture's content to the issuer and the lead undersnter. it does require
certain standardized terms. See generally Martin Rigcr. 17i Truest Indenturr a. Bar-,ained Contract The
Persistence of Myth. 16 J. CORP. L. 211 (1991) (discussiig inadequac of corporate bond indentures fron
perspective of bondholders).
176. 1 have in mind that a court would make this determination on the motion of a plaintifl's attomcy
representing or aspiring to represent a class of future claimant% 1 do not see any market atemati e to using
a judicial or administrative evaluation to compel a company to strt pa)ing tort judgments in tort bond,
rather than cash. Neither present claimants nor. in most case%. tonfeasors would hase an incentise to initiate
this action. Entrepreneurial plaintiffs' attorney., hovse.er. would ha.e the neccssar) incenti e The
procedure could be analogous to that of a creditor aiiempting to place a firm in insoluntary bankruptc).
except that instead of showing that the firm was unable to pay tort clairts as they became due. the
petitioner ,kould have to show that paying tort claims currentl, would place future claimants, at substantial
risk of having their claims impaired. Cf BAIRD & JACKSo',. supira note 20. at 105-117 idiscusing
insolvency and involuntary bankruptc)I. Courts would not hase to make a precise etimate of the salue ol
future claims. They would merely have to determine that tIme nsk to future claimants 'as sufficient in
magnitude to warrant the costs of invoking tort bond protection
177. Standard terms would also allow the exercise of sonie paternalism toward tort claimants. vho.
as involuntary and probably unsophisticated "'nsestor,, in time mass tort irmi. are hkel, to both need and
be entitled to regulatory protection.
178. See supra note 168. They would not. hosses er. be standard e/ro-coupon instruments Zcro-coumn
instruments and U.S. Treasury bills do not pay any interest. and the sell at a discount to their lace ,alue
They are thus sometimes called **discount instruments" In\ estors get their %ield b, buy ing them at a
discount. So, for example, an investor buys a S10.000. 6-month "*Tbtll" for S9.661 84 and hold, it to
maturity. The return is S338.16 ($10.000 - S9.661.84) Thits return equals a current ,ield or yield-to.
maturity of S338.161S9.661.84, or 3.50% oser the 6 months STAnq- o1- Tilt. N Y lsr Ofl Fl . supra note
126, at 94. The trust shares resemble more closely the humble Series, EE L' S Sasings Bond EE bonds are
sold at a discount to their face value. but also "pay" a floating tnterest rate They do not. howeer. actually
pay out the interest: instead of making periodic payments. the imputed interest accrues and is added to the
value of the bonds. The Treasury adjusts the interest rate 'paid" on a quarterl, basis. so that their )ield is
equal to 85% of a 5-year Treasury note. Id. at 95 The instrument% I propose swould similarly accumulate
imputed interest, at an appropriate rsk-free rate in the case of mass tort trust fund ,hate, and at an
appropriately higher rate in the case of tort bonds. The interest swould not be paid penodically, but would
accrue and be paid, subject to availability of funds, at the liquidation of the trust or the maturity of the
bonds. If funds were insufficient for full payment of principal and interest, the) would be paid pro rata.
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the term of the indenture, then a tort bond would sell at the sum of its face
value (the principal) plus the present value of the interest that would accrue
over the term of the indenture.
The price of equity in the mass tort firm, because equity represents the
residual claim, would depend in part on the anticipated size of tort
liability--expressed by the amount of tort bonds that the capital market
expected the firm would issue during the term of the indenture. Under a simple
model, the market might price equity at approximately the present value of the
firm's expected future cash flow, minus the value of expected obligations to
tort bond holders and other creditors, divided by the number of shares. Thus,
if the capital market revised upward its expectation of the magnitude of future
tort claims upon the release of a new epidemiological study, the price of equity
would decline. The decline in the price of equity would reflect the adjustment
in the amount of the firm's value that was "reserved" for tort creditors and in
the residual amount left for equity holders. Conversely, the more the value of
the firm's assets exceeded what the market expected would be owed to tort
bond holders and other creditors, the more valuable equity in the firm would
become.'79
To compensate tort claimants for the riskiness of their involuntary
investment in the mass tort firm, tort bonds should bear interest, at a rate
commensurate with that of similarly risky instruments. The interest term would
have to be higher than the risk-free rate appropriate for shares of a mass tort
trust, because, unlike trust shares, tort bonds would not represent a claim on
a pool of risk-free securities, but a claim on the assets of a single, relatively
undiversified debtor. Holders of tort bonds are involuntary investors in a much
riskier venture than are trust share holders.
Although some regulatory body could determine this rate, the same
pressures that incline reorganization negotiations and trust administrators to
favor present claimants would likely affect regulators as well. An
administrative process might set unjustifiably low rates, in order to spare
equity holders from further subordination of their claims and to spare the firm
from increased risk of bankruptcy. Alternatively, the underwriting market
might determine the rate. 8 ' The mass tort firm could negotiate for the lowest
rate at which underwriters would accept the risk that a class of nontort bonds
(identical to tort bonds, except offered originally into the public market rather
than issued to tort claimants) would not be fully subscribed. Capital raised in
this way would be part of the firm's working capital, but would otherwise have
179. Therefore, the equity would constitute an option on the value of the firm, and an options pricing
model would be appropriate for predicting the value of equity. See supra text accompanying note 69.
180. For a good description of the underwriting market and its regulation, see I Louis Loss & JOEL
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 324-80 (3d ed. 1989). For a thorough review of the development of




the same priority as, and be subject to dilution by, the tort bonds. This market
trial could establish the rates to be used for the bonds issued to tort
claimants.' 8' Finally, the bonds should be structured like "zero-coupon"
instruments.'8 2 This feature is necessary because unforeseeable developments
regarding the magnitude of future claims might require the issuance of
additional tort bonds, which might in turn dilute tort claims to the point that
the issuer could not fully pay the accumulated interest or perhaps even the face
amount of the bonds.
The pricing model for tort bonds presented above is, of course, highly
simplified. A problem with pricing tort bonds might arise if they were not
made superior to the rest of the tortfeasor's debts, including secured debt. If
tort bonds are junior to other firm debt, the capital market might price them
like leveraged equity or call options. As junior debt, tort bonds would, like call
options, only have value if firm value at the time of their maturity or exercise
date (for example, thirty years hence) was greater than the amount owed on
debt senior to the tort bonds. Under these circumstances, tort bond prices
might exhibit "time decay," the term option pricing theorists give to the
tendency of option prices to be greater, all other things being equal, the further
in the future is the exercise date of the option."' Junior tort bonds issued
with thirty-year maturities might therefore sell for a greater percentage of their
face value than those with two-year maturities, even if expectations as to the
total amount of tort liability were the same at both times. This phenomenon
might produce a bias toward earlier claimants. Temporal justice would be
served by making tort bonds superior to all other classes of debt. Even if
legislators do not make this reform, however, using tort bonds might well
achieve a greater degree of temporal justice than administrative approaches.
3. Operational Costs
A possible objection to a capital markets approach in the face of
uncertainty concerning insolvency is that such an approach would subject the
181. Cf Roe, supra note 74, at 559-62. Roe, to the best of my knowledge, was the first to suggest
that the capital markets should be used to value bankrupt firms--an important insight- My proposal bears
some similarity to his, although mine relies much more radically on the ability of markets to make
valuations.
182. For example, a tort bond with a face amount of S1000 would be awarded to a claimant who had
suffered S1000 in damages. It might bear interest at the prime rate. which would vary with inflation. to take
account of the additional risk of the potentially insolvent firm. Suppose this interest term in a given year
is 10%. If the term of the indenture were also one year, it would entitle the holder to a payment of $I 100
at the expiration of one year, assuming no unanticipated inflation. The holder would not. however, be able
to collect any interest before maturity. All of the interest would be paid at the matunty of the bond along
with the principal. The present value of the expected future interest payment would be captured only if the
holder were to sell the bond on the market.
183. See generally supra note 170.
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mass tort firm to excessively high operational costs.'8" As the firm issues tort
bonds and expectations about the size of tort damages mature, equity in the
firm might decrease in value to virtually zero and might cease to be traded at
all. My response to the objection is straightforward. This may indeed happen.
If it did happen, however, it would merely reflect the judgment of the capital
market that expected tort liability equaled or exceeded the value of the firm net
of senior obligations. In the mass tort setting, the risk that tort liability will
exceed the value of the firm is real. Someone has to bear that risk. It is
inefficient and unfair to foist any of this risk upon tort victims, whose
relationships with the mass tort firm are involuntary and who would not
choose to subsidize their malefactors. Such an allocation would also distribute
risk to persons ill equipped to bear it. Equity holders, unlike tort creditors, can
diversify their portfolios and pool the risk of mass-tort-induced insolvency with
the risks of investing in other firms. If equity holders in the reorganized mass
tort firm can find no buyers for their stock, and the stock ceases to trade on
appropriate national or other markets, then the mass tort firm should be placed
in a more conventional bankruptcy status.
4. Triggering Bankruptcy
A difficult problem in devising any mass tort bankruptcy scheme is
determining when a firm or its creditors should be able to trigger bankruptcy
protections. Roe argues that preserving the viability of a troubled firm requires
that bankruptcy be triggered "early," before equity holders, contract creditors,
and present tort claimants divert a disproportionate amount of the firm's assets
to themselves.'85 In Roe's proposal, a court would determine that tort
liabilities had reached a target magnitude, such as 50% of the firm's value, and
then place the firm in bankruptcy. More desirable would be a market
determination that tort liabilities were sufficiently large to remove control of
the firm from the stockholders and place it in trust for creditors.
The capital markets approach goes a greater distance toward providing
such a mechanism than does a scheme like Roe's. As noted above, if firms
compensated present tort claimants with tort bonds, equity prices would vary
to reflect the portion of the firm that was effectively reserved for compensatory
purposes. If equity prices reached virtually zero, or were sufficiently low that
the national securities markets stopped trading on the stock, this would reflect
the capital market's judgment that the firm was either insolvent or on the brink
of insolvency. At this point, bankruptcy law could provide that any creditor be
able to trigger bankruptcy.
184. Roe is particularly concerned with the high operational costs imposed by unresolved claims on
the mass tort firm. See Roe, supra note 62, at 856-62.
185. Id. at 862-64.
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Because tort bonds would in many instances have long maturities,
however, even equity that was well "'out of the money" might continue to sell
at significantly positive, if greatly reduced, prices. If the issuance of tort bonds
became accepted practice, firms might write into debt contracts and indentures
that depression of equity prices below specified levels (or the issuance of any
tort bonds at all) was an event of default permitting acceleration and possibly
precipitating involuntary bankruptcy. In the absence of such contractual
provisions, however, bankruptcy law could provide that if firm equity reached
some arbitrarily low price, any creditor could place the firm in involuntary
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy law would then offer tort creditors protections superior
to those that tort bond indentures and supporting laws would offer.
Answering the questions of how and when control of the firm should pass
from equity holders to tort or other creditors will require further discussion and
research. If law can impose adequately protective indentures on firms on behalf
of tort creditors, it might be desirable to keep a public firm out of a
conventional bankruptcy, so long as its equity is sufficiently valuable to trade
in a liquid capital market. Perhaps tort bonds should be convertible under
certain conditions into voting equity, as a guard against opportunism by equity
holders. In any event, the key point here is that the firm would not necessarily
be subjected to all the costs of bankruptcy procedure until a reliable market
signal indicated that the firm was actually or virtually insolvent."
5. Current Bankruptcy Law and Tort Bonds
A workable capital markets approach in the context of uncertainty about
insolvency would probably require fundamental changes in bankruptcy law.
The approach might be implemented most cleanly as a separate chapter of
186. 1 am unsure that insolvency in any sense is the event that contract creditors sould choose to
trigger collective debt collection rights in the ideal contract the) would make with the debtor in the absence
of transactions costs. Even if it were. however. it seems unlikely that prospectic involuntary creditors
designing a compensatory scheme would choose the same trigger as voluntary creditors. For the reasons
I discuss above, see supra part l.B, involuntary creditors will be more risk averse than voluntary creditors.
Consequently, involuntary creditors would prefer that special steps be taken to secure the value of the assets
from which they will be compensated earlier than would less nsk-aversc contract creditors, who can in any
event adjust the other terms of their contracts to take account of the nsks implicit in the timing of the
bankruptcy trigger. At the same time, assuming that bankruptcy law represents, as Thomas Jackson and
others have argued, see supra note 52. something like the set of collective rights contract creditors would
bargain for in the absence of transaction costs, then it does not make sense to trigger these rights at the
same time as the rights of more risk-averse tort creditors. Whatever steps are taken to protect m oluntar)
claimants should probably be different in substance and timing from steps taken to protect voluntary
creditors. I propose a scheme involving tort bonds, an accompanying indenture, and duties ossed to tort
claimants by firm officers and directors--triggered whenever a court finds there is a substantial danger that
without these protections the interests of tort claimants would be prejudiced. Whatcsr the details of a
proposed scheme, however, the fact should not be overlooked that the same set of protections triggered at
the same time may not protect fairly both voluntary and involuntary creditors The protections that
voluntary creditors would choose will impose unwanted nsk on involuntary creditors, the protections that
involuntary creditors would choose will force voluntary creditors to bear the cost of unwanted insurance
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federal bankruptcy law that would apply specifically to firms with mass tort
liability. Currently, mass tort liability is unsecured debt and is subject to
impairment in the reorganization process. In any subsequent reorganization
process, tort bond obligations would be subject to the same "hold-up" activity
by equity that makes compensation of future claimants so difficult in the first
place. Capital markets would foresee this contingency and discount tort bonds
to take account of the difficulty their holders would have collecting on them
in bankruptcy. For tort bonds to be properly priced, therefore, the bankruptcy
process must also treat mass tort claims properly. Consistent with my proposal,
tort bonds should be converted into trust shares if the mass tort firm issuer
enters bankruptcy.
Currently, the market price of bankrupt debtors' securities reflects the
power of equity holders to force reorganizations that are inconsistent with
absolute priority."' If tort bonds are to trade at prices that reflect reasonable
market assessments of the firm's value and tort liability exposure, and to
allocate available assets fairly among present and future tort claimants, then
there must be little risk that value in the firm will be diverted to inferior
claimants, such as equity holders. In any event, a tort bond scheme can only
work as well as the bankruptcy procedure it may presage. Whether or not mass
tort liability is involved, it seems doubtful that corporate reorganization in its
current form is the best way in all plausible circumstances to serve the
interests of creditors.'88 If a capital markets approach to mass tort bankruptcy
187. See supra note 46.
188. See Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter II, 101 YALE L.J.
1043 (1992) (arguing that decision to file bankruptcy has become increasingly "endogenous," resulting in
increased costs or losses, and that Chapter II should be repealed). Significant articles that argue for
fundamental reform of Chapter I I include Baird, supra note 67; Douglas Baird & Randal Picker, A Simple
Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate Re-Organization, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 311 (1991)
(comparing effects of selective stay to general automatic stay of creditors); Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New
Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988) (suggesting that creditors should
receive a set of options on postbankruptcy firms); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu
Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51 (1992) (maintaining that law should require firms
to choose, upon formation, one option from menu of bankruptcy options). A creative argument that the
mandatory bankruptcy approach could be replaced by investor contracts may be found in Adler, supra note
68 (proposing that "chameleon equity" firms with sequential priority classes of investors could eliminate
need for traditional reorganizations); Phillipe Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L.
ECON. & ORGANIZATION 523 (1992) (proposing new bankruptcy procedure in which noncash bids are
possible). Some of these proposals rely in varying degrees on what might be termed the substitution of
capital markets for the performance of allocation functions now carried out by the legal process of
bankruptcy reorganization. To my knowledge, however, this Article is the first to apply the capital markets
approach systematically to mass tort bankruptcy.
Capital markets and other alternative approaches to bankruptcy have their critics. See, e.g., Lynn M.
LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICHi.
L. REV. 79 (1992) (arguing that Bradley and Rosenzweig relied on flawed methodology and skewed
assumptions); Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter II, 102 YALE LJ. 437 (1992)
(discussing redistributive consequences of abandoning Chapter II and arguing that alternative legal
responses to business failure would entail high social costs); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate
Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411 (1990) (arguing that current bankruptcy regime is probably
efficient); Korobkin, supra note 52 (explaining how many different interests are able to express themselves
in reorganization proceedings); LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 43, at 126 (asserting that economic
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is in place, a similar approach can liquidate uncertain mass tort claims prior
to bankruptcy and, by giving them the appropriate priority relative to other
claims, allocate the value of the debtor among mass tort claimants and other
claimants before bankruptcy becomes necessary. If bankruptcy procedures, like
the current Chapter 11 procedure, are fraught with opportunities for hold-ups,
rent seeking, and other strategic ploys, however, holders of tort bonds will not
be fairly compensated. 8 9
6. Controlling Opportunism by Equity Holders and Managers
While the capital markets approach might provide a bankruptcy trigger for
mass tort firms that is attractively rooted in market rather than administrative
appraisal of asset value and tort liability, it would do so at a cost. If a mass
tort firm with uncertain mass tort liability issued tort bonds, it would increase
the "leverage" of its equity; that is, it would increase its ratio of debt to
equity.' 9° Increasing the leverage of a firm would change the incentives of
the firm's managers to the extent they were influenced by the interests of
equity holders. As a mass tort firm issued more and more tort bonds to tort
claimants, managers would acquire incentives to manage the firm in an ever-
riskier manner. A more risk-preferring management would emerge because as
the liability to tort claimants increased, the equity in the corporation would be
equivalent to options that were less and less "in the money." The minimum
amount that the assets of the firm would have to be worth in order for the
equity to have any value would increase. Standard option pricing theory
indicates that the value of an option increases with the variance of the value
of the underlying asset-in this case the value of the underlying firm."9 ' The
more tort bonds the firm issued, the more managers of the firm (to the extent
they responded to the interests of equity holders) would be inclined to deploy
the firm's assets in excessively risky ventures-ventures that would increase
the value of the equity, but decrease the value of the claims of tort (and other)
creditors. '92
analysis of bankruptcy law is indeterminate and thus not useful for suggesting changes to Chapter I1).
189. Implementing the capital markets approach where there is uncertainty concerning insolency
would raise the constitutional issue of whether bankruptcy law may permit a debtor to impair claims (which
would occur when present tort claimants received tort bonds instead of cash) before certain nsol.ency. To
take this approach, Congress would have to amend the Bankruptcy Code to create a category of
"insolvency" for firms that are not technically insolvent, but that have large mass tort liability. Arguably.
bankruptcy courts have already placed asbestos bankruptcy debtors in such a category, but my proposal
would involve extending bankruptcy powers further than courts have been willing to go without
congressional authorization. The question anses whether or not the Bankruptcy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8. cl. 4. empowers Congress to pass laws that effectively impair tort
claims against firms that are not (yet) bankrupt in the conventional sense.
190. Alternatively. from an options-pricing perspective. it increases the exercise price of the equity
holders' option on the firm's value.
191. See sources cited supra note 69.
192. This important point receives an elegant treatment in GILSON & BLACK. supra note 47. at 245-48.
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The inevitable response to this problem is some form of regulation of firm
management. Voluntary creditors can regulate managerial behavior ex ante by
specifying financial covenants that forbid managers from taking excessive risk
at pain of triggering loan defaults, or by compensating themselves for the risk
of mismanagement by charging higher interest rates. Because tort creditors are
involuntary, they lack these options. Federal law could instead impose a
regulatory regime on firms when they issue enough tort bonds to affect
significantly the incentives of the firm's management. In addition to
restrictions in tort bond indentures, federal and state courts could develop
fiduciary or similar duties that firm directors and officers would have toward
tort creditors. Under these duties, directors and officers could be held
personally liable for transactions that diverted value from tort creditors to
shareholders or other claimants. Such a duty would not be entirely novel. Some
Delaware courts have already suggested that directors may have a fiduciary
duty to creditors in settings of near insolvency. 9 3 Alternatively, fraudulent
conveyance law might provide an adequate source of restrictions on managers
of firms carrying significant mass tort liability in this form. 4 It may be
preferable, however, to leave federal courts under broad statutory guidance to
develop directors' duties to holders of tort bonds and to identify actions and
decisions that would breach those duties.
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V. CONCLUSION
Mass tort bankruptcy is currently plagued by two related problems. First,
because mass torts often inflict damage that becomes evident over a long
193. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150,
1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (mem.) (arguing that directors have fiduciary duty
to debtholders when firm approaches insolvency); see also Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d
784 (Del. Ch. 1992) (holding that fiduciary duty exists when firm is actually insolvent).
194. See Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors'
Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1993) (arguing that courts, notwithstanding their invocation
of broad fiduciary language, are in fact enforcing creditors' existing contractual rights rather than imposing
independent duty to act in creditors' best interests).
195. An attractive alternative to imposing direct regulation on the firm issuing tort bonds might be to
make the tort bonds convertible into voting equity. Conversion rights control against opportunism by equity-
oriented managers, because if managers allocate too much firm value to equity (for example, by increasing
the riskiness of firm returns) holders of tort bonds could convert some or all of their debt into equity, thus
diluting equity and taking a share of the opportunistically increased equity returns. See generally Michael
J. Brennan & Eduardo S. Schwartz, The Case for Convertibles, I J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55 (1988), which
extends ideas about the role of convertibles found in Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior Agency Costs, and Capital Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305 (1976).
Attractive as convertibles seem for this purpose, they might give rise to temporal justice problems. The
conversion privilege is, in effect, an option on an option: an option to convert the tort bond into equity,
which itself is an optionlike residual claim on firm value. The conversion privilege will presumably be
more valuable to claimants who get the right earlier, resulting in a higher level of compensation to earlier
claimants. Moreover, conversion privileges might create more pressure for opportunism by present
claimants against future claimants: Present claimants might convert to equity as soon as possible and then




period of time, it is virtually impossible for administrative procedures to
estimate accurately the total magnitude of tort liability. Without such an
estimate, courts cannot structure bankruptcy plans that treat tort or other
claimants fairly. Second, the process of estimating the magnitude of tort claims
and of structuring the mass tort bankruptcy severely disadvantages future
claimants. Present claimants evince seemingly more pressing needs. They are
better represented and strategically better placed than future claimants to
bargain for a reorganization that favors them. Present claimants can reach a
bargain with equity holders that essentially excludes future claimants from the
reorganization. The Manville bankruptcy illustrated this dynamic. There,
present claimants took part in the structuring of a plan that permitted a mass
tort trust fund to distribute in less than two years most of the funds available
to compensate tort claimants expected to emerge over several decades.
In order to counteract the considerable advantages held by present tort
claimants, a process of determining liability must take account of all publicly
available information that bears on the expected total magnitude of tort claims
and remain free from psychological biases and strategic manipulation by
participants in the process. The capital market naturally suggests itself. The
efficient capital markets hypothesis, somewhat qualified though it may be by
post-October 1987 scholarship, is well supported and strongly suggests that
capital markets have powerful capabilities to process complex information
efficiently. Capital markets, as opposed to courts and administrative bodies, are
especially suited to estimate the magnitude of a liability that is a multivariable
function. Moreover, markets are far less subject to bias and manipulation than
is the current reorganization process or any plausible claims magnitude
estimation process that a court might establish.
The capital markets approach to mass tort bankruptcy uses a relatively
simple institution-a trust fund that would issue shares to claimants giving
them a pro rata interest in the trust fund at a time sufficiently in the future to
give all or nearly all tort claims time to emerge. If the market concluded that
the trust had sufficient funds to pay all tort claims fully, the market price of
the trust shares would closely approximate the damages that a jury trial,
settlement, or an administrative board awarded to a claimant. The market price
of the trust shares would indicate the capital markets' expectations as to the
total magnitude of tort liability over the period during which all or nearly all
of that liability was expected to emerge.
A more complicated version of the capital markets approach could handle
situations involving uncertainty about whether the mass tort would render a
firm insolvent. It would probably require abandoning the Chapter 11 process
as we know it-something some sophisticated bankruptcy commentators
advocate in any event. In this version, a mass tort firm would issue to tort
claimants tort bonds that would be superior to the firm's other debt and equity.
Courts would require mass tort firms to compensate present tort claimants with
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tort bonds whenever compensating them with cash would prejudice the ability
of future tort claimants to collect on their claims. The firm would be subject
to a tort bond indenture and regulated by a fiduciary duty owed to holders of
tort bonds or by doctrines protecting creditors, such as fraudulent conveyance
law. Imposing a layer of tort bonds upon the capital structure of the mass tort
firm would allow the pricing of the firm's equity to reflect the capital markets'
valuation of both the value of the firm's assets and the expected total
magnitude of its mass tort liability. A decline in the value of the firm's equity
to a nontradeable level would provide a more reliable signal for triggering
bankruptcy than would a court's estimation that mass tort liability had reached
some specified level.
Perhaps most important, using the capital markets approach would assure
an allocation of the mass tort firm's value among present and future mass tort
claimants that was as fair as possible. The capital markets approach would
result in relatively unbiased estimates of total tort liability based on all publicly
available information (which is the most for which one can reasonably hope),
and would create a distribution process that is difficult for interested parties to
manipulate. This approach offers a promising program for the reform of our
troubled mass tort bankruptcy process.
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